



The Gang Suppression Force in Haiti: the UN Security Council's latest avatar

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Executive summary

Since 1993, the United Nations has been engaged in Haiti through a succession of missions, the most prominent of which was the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), deployed from 2004 to 2017. The UN's record is mixed. It achieved genuine tactical gains but also left a legacy of severe traumas (including sexual violence, the cholera epidemic, and the 12 January 2010 earthquake) and failed to tackle the root causes of the security crisis, particularly corruption and the weakness of the judicial system. The assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021 exposed the extent of criminal infiltration of the Haitian state and ushered in a period of transition marked by escalating violence. Organising the next general elections, the first round of which is scheduled for 13 December 2026 according to the electoral decree of 2 July of the same year, represents a significant challenge, as no elections have been held for 10 years and the country currently has no elected officials.

In 2023, Resolution 2699 established the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, a police force capped at 2 500 personnel. Its results fell far short of expectations: less than 1 000 police officers deployed, a disproportionate annual budget, and an overly restrictive mandate. The MSS failed to prevent the deterioration of the humanitarian and security crisis. In 2025, at least 5 900 people were killed as a result of gang-related violence, and more than 1,45 million (i.e. approximately 12% of the population) were internally displaced.

On 30 September 2025, Resolution 2793 formalised the transformation of the MSS into the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), a significantly stronger and more assertive force comprising 5 500 military and police personnel. Unlike the MSS, the GSF is authorised to conduct independent anti-gang operations and, as it is not a peacekeeping operation, is not bound by the rules applicable to peacekeeping operations, giving it a particularly robust and offensive mandate. The resolution also established the United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), tasked with providing logistical support to the GSF. Since 1 April 2026, these missions have coexisted with the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), a political mission created in 2019. This has resulted in an unprecedented “three-headed” architecture: BINUH (political component), UNSOH (logistical support), and the GSF (military component), each with its own chain of command. The GSF is a Security Council-authorized mission under the strategic direction of the Standing Group of Partners (SGP).

The paper identifies three key tests that will determine the success of this new architecture. The first is acceptance by the Haitian population, which will depend on tangible and rapid results (such as the return of displaced populations to their neighbourhoods and the holding of elections as scheduled in the electoral calendar of 26 July 2025), as well as on the proper conduct of deployed troops. The second test is internal to the UN and lies in ensuring close coordination between BINUH, UNSOH, and the GSF so as to avoid duplication and preserve the coherence of UN action. Third and finally, there will be a political test at the Security Council when the GSF's mandate is renewed in September 2026. The success of this tripartite framework, and any consideration of whether this model might be replicated in other theatres of operation, will depend on the outcome of these three tests.

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List of acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
AUSSOM	African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia
BINUH	<i>Bureau intégré des Nations unies en Haïti</i> - United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CRS	<i>Compagnies républicaines de sécurité (France)</i> - Republican Security Corps
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DOS	Department of Operational Support
DPO	Department of Peace operations
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
FC-G5S	<i>Force conjointe du G5 Sahel</i> - G5 Sahel Joint Force
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade (MONUSCO)
GIGN	<i>Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale (France)</i> - National Gendarmerie Intervention Group
GSF	Gang Suppression Force
HNP	Haitian National Police
HRDDP	Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IOF	International Organisation for <i>La Francophonie</i>
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MICIVIH	<i>Mission civile internationale en Haïti</i> - International Civilian Mission in Haiti
MINUJUSTH	<i>Mission des Nations unies pour l'appui à la justice en Haïti</i> - United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINUSMA	<i>Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali</i> - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	<i>Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti</i> - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	<i>Mission de police civile des Nations unies en Haïti</i> - United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo</i> - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MSS	Multinational Security Support Mission
OAS	Organization of American States
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PO	Peace Operation
RAID	<i>Recherche, assistance, intervention, dissuasion (France)</i> - Research, Assistance, Intervention, Deterrence
SGP	Standing Group of Partners
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement

SRS	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNITAMS	United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNSOH	United Nations Support Office in Haiti
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office in Somalia
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti

Introduction¹

To say that Haiti and the United Nations (UN) share an intertwined destiny is an understatement. The international organisation appears to be an integral part of the contemporary history of this small and unique Caribbean country. Haiti – a land of deportation throughout the era of the slave trade and colonisation; the first independent Black republic following a slave revolt in 1804; a founding member of the UN in 1945; and the only French-speaking country in the Caribbean – is a series of exceptions: historical, artistic, linguistic, and geographical.² As we shall see in this paper, the field of UN peacekeeping is no exception to this rule.

The mixed record of more than three decades of UN engagement in Haiti

The UN became involved in Haiti as early as February 1993 to address the consequences of the 30 September 1991 coup against the elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted to deploy the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (*Mission civile internationale en Haïti* - MICIVIH). The mission evolved over the years. In September 1993, the MICIVIH became the United Nations Mission in Haiti (*Mission des Nations unies en Haïti* - MINUAH), then the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (*Mission d'appui des Nations unies en Haïti* - MANUH), followed by the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (*Mission de transition des Nations unies en Haïti* - MITNUH) in 1997, and finally the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (*Mission de police civile des Nations unies en Haïti* - MIPONUH), which remained in place until 2000. This succession of political missions, in a sense, “created the conditions for their own continuation [...] reinforcing the idea that Haiti could not govern itself on its own”.³

In February 2004, President Aristide is once again forced into exile. Following the deterioration of the security situation in the capital, the UNSC decided to deploy a peacekeeping mission – the first of its kind to be described as a “stabilisation” mission –, known as the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (*Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti* - MINUSTAH).⁴ By far the longest-running UN mission in Haiti, with a thirteen-year presence, MINUSTAH remains the best known of the UN missions deployed in the country. At the height of its operations, following the devastating earthquake that struck Port-au-Prince on 12 January 2010, more than 12 000 military and police personnel were deployed across the country. They conducted intelligence-led operations, a first in the context of peacekeeping.⁵ In 2017, in her speech marking the end of the mission, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), Sandra Honoré, highlighted the progress made in expanding the ranks of the Haitian National Police (HNP) from fewer than 5 000 to more than 14 000 officers.⁶ This figure should be viewed in the context of the numerous robust anti-gang operations

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² ROUPERT Catherine Eve, *Histoire d'Haïti, la première république noire du Nouveau Monde*, Éditions Perrin, 2011.

³ “créent les conditions de leur reproduction [...] renforçant l'idée qu'Haïti ne pouvait assurer seule sa propre gouvernance” [French original – free translation]: VERLIN Jan, “[Les effets paradoxaux des interventions internationales en Haïti](#)”, in FERNANDEZ Julian and HOLEINDRE Jean-Vincent (eds.), *L'année des relations internationales 2025-2026 : Le temps des puissances désinhibées*, Éditions Panthéon-Assas, p. 361.

⁴ BOUTELLIS Arthur, *Rivalités pour la paix. Géopolitique de l'ONU*, Armand Colin, 2025, p. 64.

⁵ RUTENBAR Sophie, “[Peace operations in Haiti, lessons from two decades of UN engagement](#)”, *Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime*, January 2026.

⁶ “[MINUSTAH: 13 years serving Haiti](#)”, *United Nations*, 6 October 2017.

carried out by the MINUSTAH between 2006 and 2009, which, according to Michel Liégeois, supports the conclusion that, overall, “MINUSTAH has contributed significantly to the restoration of security in the country”.⁷

However, beyond its tactical successes, the MINUSTAH lacked the mandate, capacities and political support to address the drivers of the expansion of armed gangs, namely illicit trafficking, transnational organised crime, corruption and weaknesses in the judicial system.

A report by the International Peace Institute had already noted in 2013 that “failure to address the underlying factors that enable crime to flourish means that the UN risks withdrawing MINUSTAH and leaving law and order in the hands of forces that may be profiting from crime rather than fighting it”.⁸

In light of this mixed record and mindful of the challenges involved in strengthening the judicial system and combating impunity, the MINUSTAH was to give way to the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (*Mission des Nations unies pour l'appui à la justice en Haïti* - MINUJUSTH). Following its departure, the PNH rapidly weakened, as a result of the institution’s high degree of politicisation and significant gang infiltration within its ranks. MINUJUSTH was subsequently transformed into the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (*Bureau intégré des Nations unies en Haïti* - BINUH) in 2019. To date, BINUH remains the institutional successor to 22 years of continuous UN presence in Haiti.

A shared legacy of trauma

This heavy legacy comes with reciprocal traumas. On the Haitian side, collective memory is strongly marked by the scandals surrounding sexual violence committed by Sri Lankan peacekeepers between 2006 and 2009, as well as by the introduction of the cholera epidemic by Nepalese troops in 2010.⁹ For the UN, the January 2010 earthquake, which claimed the lives of more than 100 MINUSTAH personnel, remains a painful memory for the organisation, as it does for Haiti, where it left a profound national trauma. Moreover, the intense fighting conducted by MINUSTAH’s anti-gang units laid the groundwork for the 2017 report entitled *Independent Report on Improving United Nations Peacekeeping Security*,¹⁰ which highlighted the need to adapt peacekeeping to increasingly hostile and dangerous environments.

Although the period spanning from 1993 to 2023 does not fall within the scope of this research, it inevitably provides the backdrop to this paper, which examines developments in Haiti following the adoption of Resolution 2699 (2023),¹¹ establishing the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), and Resolution 2793 (2025),¹² authorising the transformation of the MSS into the Gang Suppression Force (GSF).

⁷ “la MINUSTAH a grandement contribué au rétablissement de la sécurité dans le pays” [French original – free translation]: LIÉGEAIS Michel, “[Transition post-MINUSTAH et consolidation de la paix en Haïti : défis et leçons apprises](#)”, *Note de l’OBG*, December 2021, p. 3.

⁸ KEMP Walter, SHAW Mark, and BOUTELLIS Arthur, “[The Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace Operations Deal with Organized Crime?](#)”, *International Peace Institute*, June 2013, p. 32.

⁹ WILLS Siobhán, MCLAUGHLIN Cahal, and LOUIS Ilionor, “[Sent to Haiti to keep the peace, departing UN troops leave a damaged nation in their wake](#)”, *The Conversation*, 13 October 2017.

¹⁰ Also known as the “Cruz” report, named after the former Brazilian commander of the MINUSTAH Force and author of the report: CRUZ Carlos Alberto dos Santos, “[Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business](#)”, *UN*, 19 December 2017.

¹¹ [Resolution 2699 \(2023\)](#), *United Nations Security Council*, S/RES/2699 (2023), 2 October 2023.

¹² [Resolution 2793 \(2025\)](#), *UNSC*, S/RES/2793 (2025), 30 September 2025.

The first part of this paper provides a detailed analysis of the mechanisms that underpinned the transition from the MSS to the GSF. It examines the foundations of the new Force, notably the text of Resolution 2793, the context of the GSF's deployment, its mandate, concept of operations, legal status, and use of force. The transition was made possible by the creation, under the same Resolution, of the United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH). The rapid evolution from the MSS to the GSF reflects a degree of trial and error on the part of the Security Council, and more specifically in the role played by the United States as penholder on the Haiti file. Both developments must be understood against the broader backdrop of the changes brought about by the arrival of the new US administration in January 2025.

The second part takes a more forward-looking approach. It seeks to demonstrate that the transformation of the MSS into the GSF is more than a mere semantic change. It analyses the impact and consequences of this evolution, both on the ground and within the UN, in a context marked by power rivalries among the five permanent members of the UNSC and by the declining appeal of multilateralism as a whole.¹³

This paper draws on field experience and numerous interviews conducted on the ground with key UN actors from BINUH, UNSOH, and the GSF, as well as with diplomatic sources and Haitian interlocutors, complemented by several thematic boxes.

1. The GSF: the latest iteration of international military operations under UN mandates

Like the MSS, the GSF is an *ad hoc* mission authorised by the Security Council. Its existence and operational capabilities, however, are significantly enhanced by UN logistical support through the involvement of the Department of Operational Support (DOS) and by a robust mandate. This stands in contrast to the MSS, whose operations relied almost entirely on voluntary funding, primarily from the United States, and on private companies responsible for logistics. After having examined its design, the paper will analyse the new tripartite architecture of the UN presence in Haiti established by Resolution 2793, which authorised the transformation of the MSS into the GSF and established UNSOH alongside BINUH.

1.1. The GSF's genesis

Following MINUSTAH and MSS, the GSF is, at the time of writing, the most recent UNSC-authorised operation with a mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.¹⁴ This section looks back on the complex diplomatic process that led to the adoption of Resolution 2793 on 30 September 2025, assesses the MSS, and highlights certain ambiguities surrounding the new mission's mandate.

1.1.1. The UN feeling its way forward

7 July 2021 marked a turning point in Haiti's already troubled history. Just four years after MINUSTAH's departure, the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse by 17 Colombian mercenaries exposed the extent of transnational organised crime's infiltration into the heart of the Haitian state. In terms of

¹³ BOUTELLIS Arthur, *Rivalités pour la paix*, op. cit., p. 77.

¹⁴ [Charter of the United Nations](#), adopted in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, entry into force: 6 October 1945, Chap. VII.

political violence, arms trafficking, and corruption linked to foreign actors, few events are more emblematic than the tragedy of 7 July 2021.¹⁵

From then on, the country entered a period of political transition characterised by significant levels of violence. The situation led the transitional Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, to address the nation in October 2022: *“I call on the entire international community and all countries that are friends of Haiti to stand with us and help us address this humanitarian crisis”*.¹⁶

The idea gained traction amongst Haiti’s main partners, particularly the United States, which began to advocate for the establishment of an international police mission. Kenya, for various reasons related to its bilateral relations with the United States, responded favourably to the US administration’s calls to act as the coalition’s *“framework-nation”*. Heavily involved in managing the Haitian political crisis, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) subsequently appealed to countries across the region, helping secure further commitment to troop contributions.¹⁷

It was on the basis of these announcements that, a year later, at the initiative of the United States, Resolution 2699 authorising the deployment of MSS was adopted.¹⁸ The force was capped at 2 500 police officers. However, for reasons examined later in this paper, MSS failed to achieve the expected results. This prompted the Haitian authorities, under pressure from the United States, to call for a rapid transformation of the mission. In a letter addressed to the President of the UNSC on 21 October 2024, then President of the Transition Presidential Council,¹⁹ Leslie Voltaire, formally requested that the MSS be transformed into a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO).²⁰ In response to this request, the Security Council asked the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), in November 2024, to put forward strategic recommendations on a reorientation of the international intervention in Haiti.²¹

Before issuing its recommendations, the UNSG took two developments of the utmost importance into consideration. The first was the marked deterioration in the security situation in Haiti towards the end of 2024. This was notably evidenced by attacks on civilian aircraft, which eventually led the US Federal Aviation Administration to suspend commercial flights to Port-au-Prince, a ban that remains in force today,²² as well as by attacks on residential neighbourhoods in the capital on 11 and 19 November, resulting in the evacuation of most UN personnel.²³ The second development was Donald J. Trump’s return to the US presidency on 29 January 2025. The US President, who had long made his intention

¹⁵ [“Assassinat du Président Jovenel MOÏSE : Les Droits aux garanties judiciaires de toutes les parties systématiquement violés”](#), Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, 8 juillet 2022.

¹⁶ *“Je demande à toute la communauté internationale, à tous les pays amis d’Haïti, de se tenir à nos côtés et de nous aider à combattre cette crise humanitaire”* [French original – free translation]: [“Adresse la Nation, le P.M. lance un appel à l’aide”](#), Haïti Libre, 6 octobre 2022.

¹⁷ [“Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti”](#), International Crisis Group, 19 February 2025.

¹⁸ « [Resolution 2699 \(2023\)](#) », *loc. cit.*

¹⁹ The Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) was established following an agreement between the country’s political forces on 12 April 2024, after the resignation of former Prime Minister Ariel Henry. The TPC acted as a collegial transitional presidential body from its creation until 7 February 2026, when it was dissolved and power was handed over to the transitional Prime Minister in the absence of elections.

²⁰ [“Letter dated 22 October 2024 from the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council”](#), UNSC, S/2024/765, 25 October 2024.

²¹ [“United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti - Report of the Secretary-General”](#), UNSC, S/2025/28, 13 January 2025, p. 3.

²² JUHAKENSON Blaise, [“La FAA prolonge l’interdiction des vols américains dans l’espace aérien haïtien jusqu’en septembre 2026”](#), Haitian Times, 5 mars 2026.

²³ [“United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti - Report of the Secretary-General”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 16.

to redefine the rules of multilateralism clear,²⁴ appointed Marco Rubio – a Florida senator of Cuban origin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a longstanding expert on the Caribbean and Haitian affairs – as Secretary of State.

It was against this backdrop that the UNSG issued his recommendations in a letter addressed to the UNSC on 24 February 2025.²⁵ He formally rejected the idea of a UN peacekeeping operation, stating that: *“At this stage, transitioning to a United Nations peacekeeping operation is not assessed as a feasible option. Such a transition could be considered once significant progress has been made in substantially reducing gang territorial control”*.²⁶ On the basis of the shortcomings observed in the MSS, the UNSG instead proposed establishing a United Nations Support Office to assist a non-UN mission. Modelled on the UN’s operations in Somalia since 2015, the support office would reduce the organisation’s political exposure in relation to the deployment of an offensive force, while benefiting from its logistical expertise and sustainable funding through Member States’ mandatory contributions to the peacekeeping budget.²⁷ This was a pragmatic and carefully considered proposal that took into account both the local context and the UNSC’s reluctance to deploy a new peacekeeping operation at a time when this model was itself increasingly being called into question.²⁸

Despite the UNSG’s recommendations, the new US administration did not rule out exploring other options, including possible involvement by the Organization of American States (OAS).²⁹ This option was quickly abandoned, however, given the organisation’s lack of security expertise and the reluctance of countries in the region to re-engage militarily in Haiti. During this period, other UNSC members put strong pressure on the United States to support the option proposed by the UNSG, foremost among them France, which took the initiative of drafting a non-paper for its US counterpart.³⁰

It was not until September 2025 that the United States, co-penholder with Panama, finally put Resolution 2793 authorising the transformation of the MSS into a new, larger and more offensive force, the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), to a vote.³¹ Like the MSS, the GSF would operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and benefit from the logistical support of the new Support Office (UNSOH) established by the same resolution. BINUH, meanwhile, was maintained with a renewed and adapted mandate in January 2026, thereby cementing the tripartite architecture of the UN presence in Haiti.³²

The adoption of Resolution 2793 was preceded by intense diplomatic efforts to avert the threat of a Chinese and Russian veto. This feat was made possible by the mobilisation of the states of the region – the Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, the United States, Guatemala, Jamaica and Kenya – at the

²⁴ RAMEL Frédéric, [“Politique étrangère de Trump 2 : le détricotage renforcé du Multilatéralisme”](#), *Analyse Opinion Critique*, 26 February 2025.

²⁵ [“Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council”](#), UNSC, S/2025/122, 27 February 2025.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁷ In 2015, the Security Council voted to establish UNSOS (United Nations Support Office in Somalia), which provides logistical support to the African Union, which in turn leads the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). This dual approach strengthens the African Union’s role in resolving the crisis in Somalia, whilst drawing on the expertise and resources of the Department of Operational Support (DOS).

²⁸ BOUTELLIS Arthur, *Rivalités pour la paix*, *op. cit.* p. 81.

²⁹ [“Haïti : Marco Rubio alerte sur une dérive inquiétante et appelle à une intervention de l’OEA”](#), *Vant bèf Info*, 21 May 2025.

³⁰ Interview with the French Ambassador to Haiti, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 1 June 2026.

³¹ [“Security Council Authorizes Transition of Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti to ‘Gang Suppression Force’](#)”, *UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*, 30 September 2025.

³² [“Resolution 2814 \(2026\)”](#), UNSC, S/RES/2814 (2026), 29 January 2026.

initiative of Washington and Ottawa. This mobilisation took the form of a joint letter addressed to the UNSC on 27 August 2025, a few days before the vote.³³ This letter formalised the establishment of the Standing Group of Partners (SGP) for Haiti and gave official expression to a regional appeal to the members of the Security Council, first and foremost China and Russia, to authorise the deployment of the GSF. This was an unexpected success for the US initiative, with both China and Russia ultimately abstaining, despite Haiti having recognised Taiwan for 70 years. Nevertheless, the confrontational remarks made by China's representative on the day of the vote reflected Beijing's position on the GSF: *"China has enormous difficulties regarding the draft resolution. However, we did not block its adoption in light of Haiti's dire security situation and the concerns and appeals of the international community, especially those from the Secretary-General and regional countries. This represents the utmost goodwill that China could demonstrate"*.³⁴

1.1.2. A force designed in response to the MSS's failures

The considerations that guided the establishment of this new architecture stem from the conceptual and operational limitations of the MSS. Resolution 2699 authorised the deployment of 2 500 police officers,³⁵ but on the ground, the numbers never exceeded 1 000 personnel. Several countries that had pledged to contribute ultimately failed, for various reasons of their own, to deploy the troops they had committed. Worse still, some quickly withdrew their personnel – as was the case with the Bahamas, which authorised its deployed police officers to return home due to the security situation.³⁶ In practice, Kenya provided more than three-quarters of the MSS's personnel, an engagement that did not generate much enthusiasm among the Haitian population, despite some expressions of gratitude upon the Kenyan officers' departure.³⁷ The MSS's mandate was ill-suited to the task. It was not sufficiently robust and did not authorise MSS police officers to conduct operations independently, requiring them instead to operate in support of the HNP. As a result, the MSS's ability to carry out its mission was hampered by the HNP's operational shortcomings.

From the outset, the MSS's budget depended on voluntary contributions from Member States, which were to be channelled into a dedicated trust fund managed by the UN. These contributions, however, never proved sufficient to cover the mission's operating costs in full. Chronic underfunding weakened the mission, its operations and, consequently, its ability to deter the gangs. This vicious circle quickly undermined its credibility among international partners,³⁸ while also hindering the force-generation process and creating significant logistical difficulties. The limitations faced by the MSS were clearly highlighted by the Canadian Ambassador to Haiti in an interview with the press: *"We realised quite quickly that, unfortunately, it lacked the equipment and personnel, despite everyone's goodwill [...] something more robust and larger was needed [...] we organised ourselves – together with our partners*

³³ ["Haïti: sept pays plaident pour le renforcement de la Mission multinationale de sécurité"](#), RFI, 28 August 2025.

³⁴ ["Explanation of Vote by China's Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Fu Cong on the Adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution on the Gang Suppression Force in Haiti"](#), Ministry of Foreign Affairs People's Republic of China, 30 September 2025.

³⁵ ["Resolution 2699 \(2023\)"](#), *loc. cit.*

³⁶ ["Les officiers bahaméens en Haïti autorisés à quitter le pays en cas de danger"](#), *Le Journalier*, 13 November 2024.

³⁷ CENOR Mackly Ford, ["Venir de loin pour affronter notre chaos, merci aux Kényans"](#), *Le Nouvelliste*, 31 March 2026.

³⁸ ["Who is in charge of the Haiti mission? Obstacles, objections and opacity continue to put the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti at risk."](#), *Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime*, 18 June 2024.

on the Security Council – to ensure that these lessons were incorporated into the new mandate of the Gang Suppression Force”.³⁹

Indeed, reflecting a broader mistrust of the effectiveness of international organisations, the decision to rely on private – predominantly American – firms to handle the MSS’s logistical needs (infrastructure, vehicles, troop transport, maintenance, food, water, etc.) resulted in an annual operating budget of more than 600 million USD, an exorbitant sum given the size of the mission.⁴⁰ Based on the 2 500 police officers expected to be deployed, this amounted to 240 000 USD per deployed officer per year. The actual figure was potentially much higher, given that the MSS never had more than 1 000 personnel deployed. By way of comparison, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (*Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali* - MINUSMA), with nearly 15 000 personnel deployed and a fully-fledged air fleet to operate, had an annual budget of 1.2 billion USD, or 80 000 USD per deployed personnel – i.e. at least three times less than the MSS.

The financial burden was further compounded by the colossal margins charged by US contractors, which largely explain the reluctance of states to fund the MSS model, compounded by equipment that was ill-suited to the Haitian terrain.⁴¹ In practice, 80% of the MSS’s funding came from the US government.⁴² This became a sensitive issue among partners, further fuelling the US obsession with “burden-sharing”, even though the MSS’s lack of results did little to justify its cost.⁴³ During its two-year deployment, the number of internally displaced persons doubled, according to UN figures, rising from 700 000 in October 2024 to more than 1.4 million in January 2026.⁴⁴ The number of people killed also continued to rise, with at least 5 601 people killed in Haiti in 2025 – more than 1 000 more than the total number killed in 2023, according to figures from the UN Human Rights Office.⁴⁵

Faced with gangs united under the banner of “*Viv Ansanm*” since 2022, that possess modern weaponry and ample supplies of ammunition, the policing nature of the mission showed its limitations.⁴⁶ The arrival of the second Trump administration in January 2025 brought with it a more uninhibited approach to international relations, marked by a return to “*hard power*”. There were consequently no longer any reservations within the administration about transforming the nature of the mission, which shifted from an anti-gang policing operation to a military counter-insurgency mission. Nevertheless, around a quarter of its personnel would retain a policing component, provided by Bangladesh. Resolution 2793 thus acknowledged the MSS’s limitations in the following terms: “[...] confirming the Secretary-General’s conclusion that, despite all the efforts made by the MSS, the resources allocated

³⁹ “On s’est rendu compte assez vite que, malheureusement, elle n’avait pas l’équipement, les effectifs, malgré la bonne volonté de tous [...] il fallait quelque chose de plus robuste, de plus grand [...] on s’est organisé – avec nos partenaires qui sont au Conseil de sécurité – pour que ces leçons fassent partie du nouveau mandat de la Force de répression des gangs” [French original – free translation] : PIERCIN Wethzer, NORETYL Jérôme Wendy and MÉRANCOURT Widlore, “[L’ambassadeur du Canada parle d’Haïti sans filtre](#)”, *Ayibopost*, 10 May 2026.

⁴⁰ “[The United States Votes to Establish a Haiti Gang Suppression Force: Now What?](#)”, *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, 8 October 2025.

⁴¹ OPALA Ken, “[A wasted opportunity? Haiti on the brink as Kenya's aid mission remains paralyzed](#)”, *Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime*, 14 May 2025.

⁴² To cover a budget of 600 million USD, the United Nations’ fund had raised only 113 million USD.

⁴³ “[Viv Ansanm: Comment une coalition de gangs a transformé la violence à Port-au-Prince](#)”, *Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime*, July 2024.

⁴⁴ According to data from the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

⁴⁵ “[More than 5,600 killed in Haiti gang violence in 2024](#)”, *UN News*, 7 January 2025.

⁴⁶ “[Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance](#)”, *International Crisis Group*, 15 December 2025.

and the means made available to it have not enabled it to cope with the considerable increase in the threat posed by gangs and that the Mission therefore requires sustained logistical support”⁴⁷ in order to authorise the deployment of 5 500 military and police personnel in the GSF.

1.1.3. An evolutive legal framework

As William O’Neil, a UN independent expert on the human rights situation in Haiti, points out, “*Haiti is not technically in a state of armed conflict*”.⁴⁸ Officially, “*there is no conflict, no peace process, nor even a ceasefire*”.⁴⁹ Ordinary law, namely international human rights law, therefore applies. While this legal classification may seem paradoxical in light of the figures on civilian casualties and displacement reported by the UN, it is consistent with the assessment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as with the Haitian authorities’ assessment of the security situation.⁵⁰ The latter consider HNP to be confronting criminal gangs, some of which are linked to international organised crime or have been designated as terrorist organisations by the United States and the UN. Gangs are considered as ordinary criminal groups pursuing profit-driven objectives without a political agenda. In the Haitian authorities’ view, this rules out any form of negotiation that would entail making political concessions.⁵¹ This position was confirmed by the transitional Prime Minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, in an interview with CNN in which he cautiously stated that “*negotiation is not the term that should be used*”.⁵² This further reinforced the rationale for the security-focused approach adopted by the authorities and supported by the GSF. That said, in light of the level of violence and degree of organisation of the gangs forming “*Viv Ansanm*”, the decision not to qualify the situation in Haiti as an “armed conflict” remains contested. This could change if the ICRC were to reclassify the situation as a non-international armed conflict. Such an outcome cannot be ruled out, as the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights recently classified the situation in Haiti as an armed conflict: “*the violence between the authorities in Haiti and the Viv Ansanm gang coalition that controls Port-au-Prince – is identified as an armed conflict for the first time. This classification means that serious violations of International Humanitarian Law, by any party, must now be treated – and prosecuted – as possible war crimes*”.⁵³ If the ICRC were to adopt a similar position, international humanitarian law (IHL) would apply. This would confer the formal status of “combatants” to gang members, lending them a certain degree of political legitimacy. Yet, in Haiti, gangs are “*neither revolutionaries nor insurgents*”.⁵⁴

⁴⁷ “[Resolution 2793 \(2025\)](#)”, *loc. cit.*, p. 2.

⁴⁸ Quoted in SAWAYA Naima, “[‘The Wild West’: Desperation is rampant in Haiti as gangs, vigilantes spread](#)”, *UN News*, 18 August 2025.

⁴⁹ “*il n’y a ni conflit, ni processus de paix, ni même cessez-le-feu*” [French original – free translation] : BOUTELLIS Arthur, *Rivalités pour la paix*, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁵⁰ “[‘ICRC 2024 Opinion Paper - How is the term ‘Armed Conflict’ defined in international humanitarian law?’](#)”, *ICRC*, 16 April 2024.

⁵¹ The issue of dialogue with criminal gangs has never officially been considered. Some of these groups are dismissed as mere bandits pursuing purely economic interests, whilst others are classified as terrorist organisations. In both cases, the authorities have never raised the idea of a dialogue – which implies negotiation – but rather that of surrender on terms set by the authorities.

⁵² “[The man trying to pull Haiti back from the brink](#)”, *CNN*, 1 May 2026.

⁵³ BARRETO Julia and al., [War watch. IHL in focus report.1 July 2024 to 31 December 2025](#), Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, January 2026, p. 1.

⁵⁴ “*ni des révolutionnaires ni des insurgés*” [French original – free translation] : LE COUR GRANDMAISON Romain, “[Perspective | La force seule ne suffira pas à déloger les gangs en Haïti](#)”, *Ayibopost*, 20 April 2026.

At present, international human rights law therefore provides the applicable legal framework. It applies to all national and international forces and permits the use of lethal force only for strictly defensive purposes, provided that such use is proportionate and limited to situations involving an imminent threat.⁵⁵

On paper, Resolution 2793 is consistent with international human rights law and places the GSF's action within this framework. However, a close reading reveals numerous instances of careful wording, especially in the original English version of the resolution. For instance, the terms "*as applicable*" and "*as appropriate*" are appended to virtually every reference to the applicable legal framework. This wording leaves room for potential exceptions. Article 5 of Resolution 2793 is a case in point. It provides that: "[...] *maintaining basic law and order and public safety, including through arrest and detention, as necessary and in full compliance with international law; including international human rights law, as applicable, taking steps to ensure, where appropriate and feasible, that children apprehended in such operations are referred to child protection actors and not detained with adults, ensure that all survivors of sexual violence are referred to protection and support services and cooperate closely with the Haitian judiciary, as appropriate, in order to ensure that apprehended gang members are dealt with in a manner that upholds the rule of law and sets an exemplary standard of accountability...*".⁵⁶

The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) adopted by the SGP in May 2026 translates Resolution 2793 into operational terms.⁵⁷ For the sake of consistency, the CONOPS must use a terminology that is compatible with the legal framework set by the resolution and, in particular, avoid offensive wording that could be associated with situations of armed conflict. The first draft of the CONOPS, prepared by the United States, appeared to be largely incompatible with these constraints and with the principles governing a multinational operation under UN mandate. The US was open and receptive to the feedback provided by numerous partners, whether within the UN or traditional allies.⁵⁸ This process eventually produced a final version significantly more consistent with the spirit of the resolution and aligned with the applicable legal framework. The French version of GSF as the "*Force de répression des gangs*"⁵⁹ – a translation that is neither literal nor unproblematic from an etymological standpoint – may well be seen as an early indication of the evolution that subsequently shaped the drafting of the CONOPS. The original English name may indeed be seen as reflecting the initial ambition of the mandate, whilst the more moderate French translation arguably anticipated the form the mandate ultimately took following consultations with partners.

This raises the following question for the GSF: how can the robust and offensive mandate of Resolution 2793 be implemented within an ordinary-law framework that strictly limits the use of force to defensive purposes? How will the GSF ensure that its troops, required to operate proactively in dense and unfamiliar urban areas, exercise the full and nuanced judgement necessary to comply with rules of engagement consistent with human rights? This question is all the more pressing given that Chad is currently the GSF's framework-nation,⁶⁰ and that its troops' demonstrated ability to conduct combat

⁵⁵ "[About law enforcement and human rights. OHCHR and law enforcement](#)", United Nations Human Rights – Office of the High Commissioner, consulted 15 May 2026.

⁵⁶ "[Resolution 2793 \(2025\)](#)", *loc. cit.*, art. 5. Emphasis by the author.

⁵⁷ A confidential document which the author was able to consult.

⁵⁸ Interview with the French Ambassador to Haiti, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 1 June 2026.

⁵⁹ "[Resolution 2793 \(2025\)](#)", *loc. cit.*, art. 1.

⁶⁰ "[Haïti: l'armée tchadienne double son effectif au sein de la mission multinationale de répression des gangs](#)", RFI, 21 April 2026.

operations in Sahel could be severely tested in the dense urban environment of Port-au-Prince.⁶¹ This concern was highlighted by the Haitian press in an article published in *Le Nouvelliste*: “Port-au-Prince is not the Ténéré. It is a fragmented urban landscape that gives the defender a structural tactical advantage. In Cité Soleil or Bel-Air, the manoeuvre warfare favoured by Chadian strategists is physically impossible. The streets are not avenues of approach, but bottlenecks”.⁶²

A GSF officer interviewed for this paper identifies this as the new Force’s key challenge: “The misuse of force is the main danger facing the GSF [...] we are putting in place every possible measure to mitigate these risks. Continuous troop training and military discipline will be the cornerstones of our operations, strictly governed by human rights principles (Human Rights Due Diligence Policy), as required by Resolution 2793”.⁶³ He adds that protocols are currently being put in place to enable the BINUH Human Rights Office, which operates under the joint authority of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), to be seized of any allegations concerning GSF personnel. UNSOH teams confirm that, by virtue of its relationship with OHCHR, the BINUH Human Rights Office is the only body mandated to investigate allegations of misconduct by GSF personnel.

At the Force’s level, all GSF contingent will have national investigators. While the MSS only had one gender adviser, the GSF’s civilian component will also include a child protection adviser, a women protection adviser, and a humanitarian liaison officer. These safeguards were reiterated by the GSF’s Special Representative, Jack Christofidès, who stated during his first address to the UNSC on 23 April 2026 that: “the GSF is being established as part of a rigorous, responsible and partnership-based mission, designed to achieve concrete security results while adhering to the highest standards of conduct and ensuring full respect for Haitian sovereignty”.⁶⁴

Finally, the GSF is not an organ or entity of any international organisation and does not have legal personality. This is an unaddressed issue in Resolution 2793 that adds a further complication to the establishment of the mission as the GSF cannot conclude a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) covering all of its troops. Each troop-contributing state must therefore conclude a bilateral SOFA with the Haitian authorities, even though many of them do not have diplomatic relations with Haiti. For the civilian component, this has required the establishment of a complex institutional arrangement involving CANADEM, the Canadian NGO responsible for recruiting GSF personnel, and the OAS, which provides diplomatic cover for GSF personnel once the recruitment process has been completed. This anomaly should ideally be addressed when the mandate is next renewed in September 2026.

Box 1 - The humanitarian situation in Haiti: immense needs

According to consolidated data from BINUH and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), at least 5.915 people were killed and 2.708 injured in Haiti in 2025 as a result of gang-related violence

⁶¹ NGODJI Fulbert et DA RIN Diego, “[Chad Joins the New Force Taking up the Fight against Haiti’s Gangs](#)”, *International Crisis Group*, 27 March 2026.

⁶² “Port-au-Prince n’est pas le Ténéré. C’est un tissu urbain déstructuré qui offre un avantage tactique structurel au défenseur. À Cité Soleil ou Bel-Air, la guerre de mouvement chère aux stratégies tchadiens est physiquement impossible. Les rues ne sont pas des axes de pénétration, mais des goulots d’étranglement” [French original – free translation] : SURIN Réginald, “[Le piège du béton : pourquoi les « Guerriers du Sahel » risquent de se briser sur les récifs de Port-au-Prince](#)”, *Le Nouvelliste*, 7 avril 2026.

⁶³ Interview with a GSF executive, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 21 April 2026.

⁶⁴ “[Jack Christofides \(GSF\) on the question concerning Haiti — Security Council, 10144th meeting](#)”, *UN Web TV*, 23 April 2026.

and security operations. These figures are higher than those recorded in 2024, when 5.600 people were killed – a toll that led Port-au-Prince to be ranked as the world’s most dangerous city that year.⁶⁵

Initially concentrated in the West Department, particularly the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, gang violence has spread to the Centre and to the Artibonite departments over the past two years. In 2025, the IOM recorded more than 1.45 million internally displaced persons, representing around 12% of the country’s total population, with a sharp increase over the course of the year and women and children disproportionately affected.⁶⁶ This is again a sharp increase in comparison to previous years. This figure is further compounded by people forcibly deported from the Dominican Republic and the United States as a result of increasingly restrictive deportation policies, further swelling the ranks of vulnerable populations.

Food insecurity has followed the same trends. More than 5.7 million people (52% of the population) face acute food insecurity, including 1.9 million in an emergency situation. Around 6,4 million people are in need urgent humanitarian aid.

At the beginning of 2026, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) presented a humanitarian plan requiring 800 million USD, 680 million USD of which are earmarked for priority needs.⁶⁷ As of 1 May 2026, however, only 195 million USD had been raised – representing 22% of the total needs. 73% of this sum was contributed by the United States.

1.2. Resolution 2793: one mandate, two departments and three missions

Resolution 2793 provides for the coexistence of two UN missions: BINUH, a special political mission under the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), and UNSOH, an operation under the Department of Operational Support (DOS). Between these two missions, the resolution transforms the MSS into the GSF. The latter is entirely dependent on UNSOH for logistical support, while its activities are closely linked to BINUH, whose political work to strengthen Haitian institutions provides an essential counterpart to the GSF’s security role.⁶⁸ To oversee the GSF, the resolution also introduces a new institutional arrangement through the creation of the SGP.

1.2.1. A new three-pronged UN architecture

Resolution 2793 calls on the UNSG, and therefore on his Special Representative and Head of BINUH, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, “to support the GSF [...] [by] provid[ing] advice and guidance...”.⁶⁹ It also requests the Secretary-General “to report to the Security Council in detail on the implementation of this resolution, including but not limited to on any challenges faced by the GSF and UNSOH in carrying out their mandates...”.⁷⁰ Furthermore, the resolution provides for the establishment of UNSOH, whose mandate is “to provide support, primarily to the GSF, BINUH, the HNP and the Haitian armed forces on

⁶⁵ [“Haiti: The human rights situation remains extremely worrying in the fourth quarter of 2025, with nearly 6,000 deaths and more than 2,700 people injured over the year”](#), BINUH, 30 January 2026.

⁶⁶ [“Haiti’s Displacement Crisis Hits Record 1.5 Million Amid Escalating Violence”](#), IOM, 5 June 2026.

⁶⁷ [“Haïti. Besoins humanitaires et Plan de réponse”](#), OCHA, 19 December 2025.

⁶⁸ LE COUR GRANDMAISON Romain, [“Perspective | La force seule ne suffira pas à déloger les gangs en Haïti”](#), *loc. cit.*

⁶⁹ [“Resolution 2793 \(2025\)”](#), *loc. cit.*, art. 20.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, art. 24.

*any joint operations with the GSF, as well as technical support to the OAS, with a view to assume full logistical support responsibility of the GSF”.*⁷¹

BINUH’s role is described by its head as follows: *“As a special political mission, we work in supporting political dialogue and strengthening governance, and we also maintain the essential work of reporting on and monitoring the human rights situation throughout Haiti [...] the mandate of the UN Mission on the ground, BINUH, has recently been reinforced to support the holding of elections. We also work with the government in the disarming, dismantling and reintegration of gang members”.*⁷² With regard to the establishment of UNSOH and the GSF under Resolution 2793, the Head of BINUH is keen to emphasise the distinction between the two: *“While administrative services are shared, UNSOH operates as a different office with a distinct mandate [...] The GSF is not a UN mission; it is authorized by the Security Council but is a Force with its own chain of command and operates independently”.*⁷³

UNSOH is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, Daniela Kroslak, who has held the position since 19 March 2026. As her team explained during an interview conducted on the ground, UNSOH’s primary role is to support the GSF through non-lethal assistance, providing the logistical support required for its deployment and operations.⁷⁴ Resolution 2793 also provides for BINUH to transfer its entire logistical component to UNSOH, which is now responsible, *“on a cost-recovery basis”*,⁷⁵ for providing BINUH with logistical, administrative and transactional support. This arrangement has raised concerns within BINUH that it could eventually find itself under UNSOH’s effective control, potentially creating friction between the two entities. These concerns are exacerbated by the broader dynamics surrounding the establishment of UNSOH – the first new UN operation to be established since 2014 – with staffing levels projected at nearly 400 for UNSOH, compared with only around 50 for BINUH. This complex architecture is further complicated by the presence of 19 UN agencies in Haiti, coordinated by the Resident Coordinator and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Nicole Kouassi. Some well-informed observers have therefore described the arrangement as, ultimately, a *“three-and-a-half-headed”* architecture.⁷⁶

The architecture established by Resolution 2793 is therefore a complex one, bringing together three senior officials who must coordinate closely to establish effective *“deconfliction”* mechanisms. All those involved acknowledge the significant risks arising from the geographical setting, the density and the urban concentration of the areas in which security and humanitarian operations will be conducted simultaneously.⁷⁷ This requires all stakeholders to have a clear understanding of each other’s respective activities. During one meeting, for example, the GSF team stressed to humanitarian agencies the importance of ensuring that aid followed swiftly in the wake of operations and the reopening of neighbourhoods. A humanitarian representative responded that aid would not *“follow”* in this sense, simply because humanitarian agencies were already operating wherever needs existed, including in areas under the control of criminal gangs.⁷⁸ The exchange illustrates the need to establish a workable *modus operandi* between the GSF and humanitarian actors, allowing each to fulfil its mandate without compromising the safety of those involved. It was in this spirit that the first

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, art. 10.

⁷² [“Carlos Ruiz Massieu: ‘Only the Haitians have the solutions’”](#), UN – Peace and Security, April 2026.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Interview with the team of the Head of UNSOH, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 5 May 2026.

⁷⁵ [“Resolution 2793 \(2025\)”](#), *loc. cit.*, art. 10.

⁷⁶ Anonymous source, BINUH.

⁷⁷ Interview with a UN humanitarian source, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 3 May 2026.

⁷⁸ Interview with a humanitarian actor, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 3 May 2026.

coordination meeting between the three entities was held on 15 April 2026, marking the beginning of a process of regular coordination on a semi-institutional basis.⁷⁹ The GSF is also in the process of recruiting a humanitarian liaison officer, who will be responsible for putting in place the mechanisms needed both to protect humanitarian actors and to facilitate the effective conduct of GSF operations.

1.2.2. The Standing Group of Partners (SGP): the GSF's governing board?

Resolution 2793 formalises and recognises the SGP, which comprises the Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, the United States, Guatemala, Jamaica and Kenya. The UNSC *“welcomes the Standing Group’s role to provide, in consultation with the Government of Haiti, high-level strategic direction, oversight, and relevant political decision-making for the GSF as appropriate, while operational command and day-to-day operational decision-making remains with the Force Commander, to include leading on (a) securing voluntary financial contributions for personnel reimbursements; (b) facilitating force generation; and (c) providing strategic representation and coordination for the GSF”*.⁸⁰

The SGP initially comprised the countries that had formed a support group for the creation of the MSS. These included the regional troop-contributing countries, Kenya as the framework nation, as well as the United States and Canada, owing to their diplomatic engagement and substantial financial contributions to the MSS’s operations. In this regard, the United States has repeatedly stressed that its total contribution to Haiti has exceeded USD 1 billion since 2021. This has fuelled its insistence on developing cost-sharing mechanisms.⁸¹ Resolution 2793 addresses this concern by assigning the GSF’s main operating costs to Member States’ assessed contributions to the UN.

The SGP’s composition is intended to remain flexible, evolving in line with Member States’ contributions of personnel, equipment or funding. States that contributed to the MSS but will no longer do so under the GSF are not expected to remain members of the SGP. Conversely, new contributing states—Chad, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Côte d’Ivoire⁸²—could join if they so request. Nevertheless, several sources involved in the SGP indicate that its operating procedures, as well as the rules governing membership and participation, have yet to be finalised. Similarly, Germany, which has announced a 35 million USD contribution to the GSF’s dedicated trust fund, would be eligible to join the SGP should it request membership.⁸³ Its admission would then be subject to a vote by the SGP members.

France has expressed an interest in joining the SGP, in light of its position as the third-largest international donor, after Canada and the United States. However, SGP members considered France’s financial commitment to the GSF insufficient to warrant membership, particularly given that it has no personnel deployed within UNSOH or the GSF. Of the 40 million EUR committed by France to Haiti, most has been allocated to bilateral cooperation—including the training of specialised HNP units by personnel from RAID (*Recherche, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion* - Research, Assistance, Intervention, Deterrence), the GIGN (*Groupe intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale* - National Gendarmerie Intervention Group), the CRS (*Compagnies républicaines de sécurité* - Republican Security

⁷⁹ Carlos Ruiz Massieu, [“Inaugural meeting of the coordination mechanism bringing together @BINUH UN, UNSOH, @UNHaiti and @GSForceHaiti — a key step towards aligning priorities and strengthening coherent support for political, humanitarian and security efforts in Haiti.”](#), X, 15 April 2026.

⁸⁰ [“Resolution 2793 \(2025\)”](#), *loc. cit.*, art. 7.

⁸¹ DAS Chandrima, [“Sharing the burden of securing Haiti”](#), *Stimson Center*, 5 September 2025.

⁸² NORESTYL Jérôme Wendy, [“Que sait-on de la Force de Répression des Gangs ?”](#), *Ayibopost*, 20 April 2026.

⁸³ [“L’Allemagne annonce une contribution de 35 millions de dollars à la force internationale anti-gangs en Haïti”](#), *Vant Bèf Info*, 21 December 2025.

Corps) and the Paris Police Prefecture, as well as equipment donations—alongside humanitarian aid and linguistic and cultural cooperation.

Since the establishment of the trust fund by Resolution 2699 (2023) and its extension to the GSF's activities under Resolution 2793 (2025), the fund had received 184,2 million USD as of 5 July 2026. Contributions were distributed as follows: Canada, 84 million USD; Germany, 46 million USD; the United States, 15 million USD (in addition to significant bilateral contributions to the GSF); France, 12 million USD; and South Korea, 9.8 million USD. Smaller contributions have also been made by Mexico, Austria, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Greece, Türkiye and Singapore. Significant additional contributions have been announced by Qatar (30 million USD) and the Dominican Republic (20 million USD). All these data are publicly available and regularly updated.⁸⁴

The SGP effectively functions as the GSF's governing board.⁸⁵ It is responsible for discussing and approving key documents, such as the CONOPS, as well as major decisions concerning membership and senior appointments, including those of Special Representative, Jack Christofidès, and Force Commander, Major General Erdenebat Batsuuri. The SGP sets the GSF's broad strategic orientations, which are subsequently translated into operational terms by the General Staff. The Canadian Ambassador to Haiti describes the SGP as *"the partner members who have been identified by the Security Council precisely to lead and establish this force"*.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, the UNSC remains the body exercising oversight, as it is the authority under whose mandate the GSF operates. The presence of Special Representative Jack Christofidès at the two Security Council meetings on Haiti held after the Force's establishment, on 16 April and 20 July, confirms that the new force remains accountable to the UNSC.⁸⁷

The creation of the SGP was intended, in part, to distance the UN from responsibility for the GSF's actions and decisions, thereby preserving the organisation's impartiality and legitimacy. Responsibility for the GSF's actions would thus rest primarily with the SGP, particularly its two most active members, the United States and Canada, which occupy a prominent position in decision-making.

1.2.3. GSF/UNSOH: it takes two to tango

This new architecture avoids applying an already strained peacekeeping model to a country where, officially, there is neither an armed conflict nor a peace to maintain. Yet violent clashes are taking place between defence and security forces and armed gangs, with severe consequences for the State and the population. A peace enforcement mission, with logistical support from the UN, was therefore deemed necessary.⁸⁸

The GSF is a UNSC authorised force whose rules – including rules of engagement, operational arrangements, conduct, fundraising and force generation – have been delegated to the SGP. According

⁸⁴ ["Contributions to the Trust Fund for the Multinational Security Support \(MSS\) mission for Haiti authorised under SCR 2699 \(2023\) and Gang Suppression Force \(GSF\) authorised under SCR 2793/\(2025\)"](#), *Peace Security Data Hub*, consulted 2 July 2026.

⁸⁵ Interview with a GSF executive, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 21 April 2026.

⁸⁶ *"les membres partenaires qui ont été identifiés par le Conseil de sécurité pour justement diriger, mettre en place cette force"* [French original – free translation]: PIERCIN Wethzer, NORETYL Jérôme Wendy et MÉRANCOURT Widlore, *"L'ambassadeur du Canada parle d'Haïti sans filtre"*, *loc. cit.*

⁸⁷ ["Elections 'Only Credible Path' Back to Constitutional Order in Haiti, Mission Chief Tells Security Council, as Gang Suppression Force Speeds Deployment"](#), *UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*, 23 April 2026.

⁸⁸ Interview with the team of the UNSOH head, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 5 May 2026.

to the UNSOH's team, *"there are parallels to this structure, the closest being the United Nations Support Office in Somalia, but no precedent"* (see Box 2 below).⁸⁹

Despite the theoretical and rhetorical safeguards surrounding the principle that the UN would in no way be associated with GSF operations, reputational risks remain a concern, particularly in a country where the UN already carries a significant legacy of past failures. The architecture established by Resolution 2793, which formally separates the entities, cannot obscure the intrinsic link between UNSOH and the GSF. A close reading of the mandate makes this clear. UNSOH is required to provide the GSF with *"provision of rations, fuel, water, accommodation, and all necessary infrastructure to include the primary GSF base and any forward bases, medical support, mobility support for personnel and equipment to include ground transportation and aviation and troop rotation, strategic communications, information technology, and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) support"*.⁹⁰ In practice, this mandate entails daily interaction between UNSOH and GSF personnel, with constant movement between the two missions, which are located in close proximity to one another around Port-au-Prince airport. The decision not to co-locate the two entities was however described as *"a matter of course"*.⁹¹

Beyond logistics, Resolution 2793 *"requests UNSOH to maintain close and sustained collaboration, coordination, and information sharing on support to the GSF, as appropriate, between all United Nations political, development, humanitarian, and financial entities, as well as other local and international partners operating in Haiti"*.⁹² The reference to *"information-sharing"* marks a further step in the collaboration between UNSOH and the GSF. More problematically, perhaps, this provision can be read alongside the GSF's mandate to conduct *"intelligence-led targeted, counter-gang operations"*.⁹³ If *"information-sharing"* by UN entities in support of the GSF were to extend to operational intelligence used to conduct lethal operations, the relationship between the UN and the GSF would take on a far more strategic dimension. It would also heighten the reputational risks for the UN, troop-contributing countries as well as for the two main members of the SGP, the United States and Canada.

Finally, the Head of UNSOH holds observer status within the SGP.

Box 2 - A unique framework that draws on a range of experiences

- Experience of the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM)

The experience in Somalia is the one that most closely resembles the model established in Haiti. The United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) was established by Resolution 2245 in 2015.⁹⁴ The resolution amended the mandate of the UN Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), but also the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the Somali security forces and other partners. UNSOS provides primarily non-lethal support—including logistics, medical services, engineering and air transport—to the AU-led operation, thereby helping ensure its

⁸⁹ *"il existe des parallèles à cette architecture, dont la plus proche est la mission du Bureau d'Appui des Nations unies en Somalie, mais aucun precedent"* [French original – free translation]: *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ ["Resolution 2793 \(2025\)"](#), *loc. cit.*, art. 10.

⁹¹ Interview with the team of the UNSOH head, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 5 May 2026.

⁹² ["Resolution 2793 \(2025\)"](#), *loc. cit.*, art. 11.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, art. 1.

⁹⁴ ["Resolution 2245 \(2015\)"](#), UNSC, S/RES/2245 (2015), 9 November 2015.

operational sustainability, particularly through reliable medical and logistical support. This resolution paved the way for Resolution 2719 of 2023, which established an institutional and legal framework allowing the UN to finance AU-led peace operations.⁹⁵

- Experience of MINUSMA's logistical support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force

MINUSMA provided operational and logistical support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force (*Force conjointe du G5 Sahel* - FC-G5S) pursuant UNSC Resolution 2391 (2017).⁹⁶ Like the GSF, the FC-G5S comprised approximately 5 000 troops drawn from the armed forces of its member states.

Following the United States' refusal to allow the peacekeeping budget to finance the FC-G5S's activities, the European Union provided funding through a complex technical agreement between the UN, the EU and the G5 Sahel states. This support mainly covered medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), access to essential supplies such as fuel, water and rations, the use of UN engineering equipment, and support from MINUSMA engineering units to prepare the FC-G5S's operational bases. Funded entirely through international voluntary contributions coordinated by the EU, this mechanism was implemented at the discretion of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSMA. It was intended as a temporary arrangement to help the FC-G5S gradually achieve greater self-reliance. This model of cooperation between a UN peacekeeping mission and an African regional force was an important innovation, despite the numerous constraints it faced.⁹⁷ The agreement also required the G5 Sahel states (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad), together with partners including the OHCHR, to establish "*a robust compliance framework to prevent, investigate, address and publicly report violations and abuses of human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law related to the FC-G5S*".⁹⁸ This framework sought to address significant disparities in the initial training of some armed forces, particularly the Chadian army, where career soldiers have gradually come to serve alongside former rebels who either came to power or were reintegrated into the armed forces under peace agreements.⁹⁹ The OHCHR is now working to adapt this compliance framework, originally developed for the FC-G5S, for training GSF contingents.

- Experience of the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade

The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was established by UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013).¹⁰⁰ Created on an exceptional basis and "*without setting a precedent*", it was the first—and remains the only—offensive force integrated into a UN peacekeeping operation. Its primary mandate, exercised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was to neutralise and disarm armed groups posing a threat to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC, in support of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In particular, the FIB played a decisive role in the military defeat of the 23 March Movement (M23) in late 2013. Although praised for its innovative nature and initial operational successes, the FIB remains controversial because of the risks associated with its deployment, including potential reprisals against the civilian population, as well as its limited long-term impact. Unlike the GSF, however, the FIB was not authorised to conduct autonomous operations.

⁹⁵ "[Resolution 2719 \(2023\)](#)", UNSC, S/RES/2719 (2023), 21 December 2023.

⁹⁶ "[Resolution 2391 \(2017\)](#)", UNSC, S/RES/2391 (2017), 8 December 2017.

⁹⁷ OLLIVIER Bertrand, "[Les implications de la mise en place de la Force-Conjointe du G5 Sahel sur la MINUSMA et les contributeurs régionaux](#)", *Note de l'OBG*, 12 April 2021.

⁹⁸ "[Resolution 2391 \(2017\)](#)", *loc. cit.*, art. 21.

⁹⁹ "[New Challenges for Chad's Army](#)", *International Crisis Group*, 22 January 2021.

¹⁰⁰ "[Resolution 2098 \(2013\)](#)", UNSC, S/RES/2098 (2013), 28 mars 2013.

2. The GSF and the changing face of multilateralism

The second part of this paper argues that the adoption of Resolution 2793 must also be understood against the backdrop of the current crisis facing UN peacekeeping, both in relations to peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and special political missions. Since 2014, the Security Council had authorised no new peacekeeping operations, while the number of existing missions was also declining. UNOCI and MINUSTAH came to an end in 2017, followed by four further mission closures announced since 2023: MINUSMA in Mali, MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). This succession of mission termination placed the issue of host-state consent at the heart of UN deliberations.¹⁰¹ In a context of growing geopolitical rivalries, host-state consent has increasingly become a matter of negotiation among major powers. This dynamic reflects the deterioration of relations among the five permanent members of the Security Council, particularly since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It also highlights their growing inability to “*compartmentalise*” their differences, as they had done in the past, and to prevent geopolitical rivalries from undermining consensus around UN missions.¹⁰²

These developments have direct consequences for the DPPA's activities and, consequently, its budget. They also affect the department's broader influence, which has historically been closely associated with France. By contrast, the DAO, which oversees the deployment of UNSOH and plays a key role in the GSF's success, can use this new structure to consolidate its position in the peacekeeping field, having previously occupied a more subsidiary role in relation to the DPPA. We shall first examine the factors that enabled the GSF to secure a favourable vote in the Security Council before turning to the triple test that its deployment represents.

2.1. The GSF's main characteristics

Resolution 2793 did not receive unanimous support in the Security Council. China, Russia and Pakistan abstained, signalling their reservations about this US-led initiative while taking care not to block it. The political cost of vetoing a resolution supported by countries in the region was apparently not considered worth bearing. For China in particular, abstaining also helped secure US support for the drafting of the mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).¹⁰³ Beyond these geopolitical considerations, Resolution 2793 contains several features that helped overcome the deadlocks generated by competing power interests.

2.1.1. A mandate insulated from politics

The first objective of the GSF's mandate is to “*Conduct either independently or as appropriate, together and in cooperation with the HNP and Haitian armed forces, intelligence-led targeted, counter-gang operations to neutralize, isolate, and deter gangs that continue to threaten the civilian population, abuse human rights and undermine Haitian institutions [...] Conduct either independently or as appropriate, together and in cooperation with the HNP and Haitian armed forces, intelligence-led*

¹⁰¹ BAYET Camille, “[L'ONU face au défi du consentement des États hôtes d'opération de paix](#)”, *Note de l'OBG*, 19 September 2024.

¹⁰² BOUTELLIS Arthur, *Rivalités pour la paix*, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

¹⁰³ Intervention of Arthur Boutellis in “[À quoi sert encore l'ONU ?](#)”, *Le Collimateur*, 7 April 2026.

targeted, counter-gang operations to neutralize, isolate, and deter gangs that continue to threaten the civilian population, abuse human rights and undermine Haitian institutions”.¹⁰⁴

The Security Council has thus given the GSF a mandate that is narrowly focused on security and explicitly robust in nature. Separating security from political considerations appears to have been the only viable way of ensuring support for the deployment of a new international force in Haiti. As the UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of BINUH, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, explains: *“The GSF is not a UN mission; it is authorized by the Security Council but is a Force with its own chain of command and operates independently”*.¹⁰⁵ This approach departs from the doctrine that had prevailed since the emergence of so-called *“third-generation”* operations. From the 2010s onwards, the mandates became increasingly multidimensional and complex, ultimately diverting attention from what was supposed to remain their primary objective: securing a political solution.¹⁰⁶ The return to a narrowly security-focused mandate can therefore be understood as a response to the shortcomings of the *“Christmas tree mandates”* characteristic of multidimensional missions.

This configuration meets two objectives. First, it allows a multilateral framework to accommodate a more robust and proactive posture by an international force. Second, it creates greater distance from the UN’s decision-making processes. In theory, this should provide greater operational flexibility, as decisions are taken within the SGP rather than being exposed to the risk of deadlock in the Security Council. At the same time, it seeks to address longstanding criticism of the bureaucratic and institutional rigidity of UN operations while preserving, as far as possible, the UN’s reputation and legitimacy.

2.1.2. An unprecedented use of force in a multilateral context

Peacekeeping is governed by the application of *“the three basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping”* formalised by the Capstone Doctrine: i) consent of the parties; ii) impartiality of the mission; and iii) non-use of force except in self-defence or in defence of the mandate.¹⁰⁷

The mandate of a robust peacekeeping operation established under Chapter VII may include the wording *“authorises [the mission] to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate”*.¹⁰⁸ Even so, the use of force remains subject to the principles governing peacekeeping operations and to the specific objectives assigned to the mission, traditionally the implementation of a peace agreement or the protection of civilians. In other words, the use of force is a means to an end: it serves the mandate. If it risks undermining the objectives of the mandate – particularly a peace process – it will consequently be avoided, even at the risk of exposing the mission to accusations of impotence despite the resources deployed.

In a conventional peacekeeping operation, the use of force generally serves to deter the so-called *“spoilers”* (or *“saboteurs”* in French), who seek to undermine the peace process. These may include armed groups that are not signatories to a peace agreement, criminal networks or, more recently, as

¹⁰⁴ [“Resolution 2793 \(2025\)”](#), *loc. cit.*, art. 1.

¹⁰⁵ [“Carlos Ruiz Massieu”](#), *loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁶ OLLIVIER Bertrand, [“Les Opérations de paix et la primauté des solutions politiques aux conflits. Portée et défis du rôle de la médiation”](#), *Note de l’OBG*, 16 November 2023.

¹⁰⁷ [“United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines”](#), UN – Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008, p. 31.

¹⁰⁸ [UN Charter](#), *op. cit.*, chap. VII.

was the case in Mali, terrorist groups.¹⁰⁹ As Arthur Boutellis notes, *“the military tool and the use of force at the tactical level are important in contexts where spoilers resort to violence. However, an effective long-term stabilisation response can only be multidimensional and must combine political and security tools...”*¹¹⁰ This understanding stands in stark contrast to the very nature of the GSF’s mandate, which places the fight against *“spoilers”* – generally treated as a secondary concern – at the centre of its mission.

“The GSF is not a peacekeeping mission”.¹¹¹ As a result, the GSF, through the SGP which defines its operating rules, can adopt a more flexible interpretation of the three guiding principles traditionally associated with peacekeeping, particularly the principles governing the use of force and impartiality. Article 1 of Resolution 2793 authorises the GSF to *“conduct either independently or as appropriate, together and in cooperation with the HNP and Haitian armed forces, intelligence-led targeted, counter-gang operations to neutralize, isolate, and deter gangs [...]”*.¹¹² The wording makes clear that the use of force is central to the GSF’s mandate, which distinguishes from a traditional peacekeeping operation. The mandate even encourages the Force *“to enter gang territories and not to retreat”*, while reinforcing its capacity to act through arrest powers, air support and the boarding capabilities of its maritime component.¹¹³ Moreover, the force-generation process stipulated that troop-contributing countries should not attach *caveats* to their participation.¹¹⁴ This represents another significant step towards greater operational effectiveness and coordination compared with a traditional peacekeeping operation.

The GSF is also authorised to make more extensive use of intelligence than is normally allowed under the framework governing *“peacekeeping intelligence”* (intelligence in a peacekeeping context), developed in 2019 in response to the increasingly complex and dangerous environments in which operations are deployed.¹¹⁵

Moreover, the GSF will operate in an environment where US private military companies are already conducting operations at the request of the Haitian government. These companies are known for their use of explosive drones, making their activities particularly sensitive in Haiti given allegations of human rights violations and extrajudicial killings. In a report published in March 2026, *Human Rights Watch* documented at least 1 243 people killed and 738 injured by drone strikes between March 2025 and January 2026.¹¹⁶ *Amnesty International* also raised the issue in a press release published on 12 May 2026, warning that *“drone attacks raise serious human rights concerns and threaten children”*.¹¹⁷ US authorities have faced repeated criticism in Haiti because of the US nationality and past record of Erik Prince, the head of the private military company *Vectus Global*. As US *Chargé d’Affaires* Henry Wooster

¹⁰⁹ OLLIVIER Bertrand, [“Le maintien de la paix face au terrorisme : la France au Mali”](#), in FERNANDEZ Julian and HOLEINDRE Jean-Vincent (eds.), *Annuaire français de relations internationales*, 2020, p. 135-150.

¹¹⁰ *“l’outil militaire et l’usage de la force au niveau tactique sont importants dans les contextes où des spoilers font usage de la violence. Toutefois, une réponse efficace de stabilisation dans la durée ne peut être que multidimensionnelle et associer outils politique et sécuritaire...”* [French original – free translation]: BOUTELLIS Arthur, *Rivalités pour la paix*, op. cit., p. 69.

¹¹¹ Interview with a GSF executive, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 21 April 2026.

¹¹² [“Resolution 2793 \(2025\)”](#), loc. cit., art. 1.

¹¹³ Interview with a GSF executive, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 21 April 2026.

¹¹⁴ Interview with a GSF executive, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 21 April 2026.

¹¹⁵ [“Policy – Peacekeeping Intelligence”](#), UN – Department of Peace Operations, May 2019.

¹¹⁶ [“Haiti: Drone Strikes Put Residents at Risk”](#), *Human Rights Watch*, 10 March 2026.

¹¹⁷ [“Haiti: Drone attacks raise serious human rights concerns and threaten children”](#), *Amnesty International*, 14 May 2026.

– appointed to “*leading a whole-of-government approach to U.S. policy on Haiti*.”¹¹⁸ –, however, explained in a press interview, the matter is “*entirely a project between the Haitian government and this private military contractor*”. He further stressed that US private military companies “*do not report to us. They do not work for us. We have an interest for the obvious reason that they are here to fight the gangs [...] there is no secret agenda here*”.¹¹⁹

The private military company and the GSF thus share a common objective: combating armed gangs. Their legal and institutional frameworks, however, are fundamentally different. The former operates under a contract between the Haitian State and a private service provider, outside parliamentary scrutiny and with distinct questions of accountability and liability. The latter operates under a mandate adopted by the UNSC, thereby engaging the collective responsibility of Member States for the actions of the force. While coordination is necessary to prevent incidents between the two actors, it must not develop into operational cooperation. The reputational risks for the GSF – and, by extension, for the UN – are significant and are a clear source of concern for international actors. What, for instance, would happen if GSF personnel were held responsible for damage caused by drone strikes against civilian populations? On paper, the distinction between the two actors is clear; on the ground, however, it could become blurred in a dense urban environment. This makes sustained public communication essential and, above all, requires active monitoring and, where necessary, a rapid response to counter potential misinformation.

2.1.3. The UN as a coordinator rather than a decision-maker

Even though the UN has delegated the governance of the external operation to the SGP and the operational command of military operations to the GSF, the Security Council remains the ultimate oversight authority for the entire undertaking. Beyond authorising the GSF’s deployment, the UN continues to oversee and enable its operations. On the logistical front, UNSOH has been providing support to the GSF since 1 April 2026. During his visit to Haiti that same day, Atul Kharé, Under-Secretary-General and Head of the DOS, described this as a significant achievement. Yet the mission remains under constant pressure from the United States, as US *Chargé d’Affaires* Henry Wooster made clear: “*Before the end of the summer, you [the Haitians] must have everyone in place – all the equipment from all over the world, all the soldiers from all over the world – and everything must be fully operational [...] you are moving soldiers from Mongolia, Chad, Sri Lanka, amongst other countries, and from Central America as well. You’re moving soldiers. You’re moving equipment — very heavy, large-scale equipment, not just, you know, your boots and your helmet, but a great deal of heavy military equipment. All of this has to be brought into Haiti, whose airport is closed, isn’t it? It’s complicated, but progress is being made*”.¹²⁰

On the political front, although the GSF has no political mandate, the actions of a military force can only complement a broader political process. Like many experts, researcher Romain Le Cour Grandmaison stresses that Haitian gangs “*do not seek to overthrow the state or replace it; they are not*

¹¹⁸ « [Announcing Ambassador Wooster’s Role in Haiti](#) », U.S. Department of State, 30 mai 2025.

¹¹⁹ “*ne nous rendent pas compte. Ils ne travaillent pas pour nous. Nous avons un intérêt pour la raison évidente qu’ils sont ici pour combattre les gangs [...] il n’y a pas d’agenda secret ici*” [French original – free translation]: MÉRANCOURT Widlore, “[Interview exclusive avec Henry T. Wooster](#)”, Ayibopost, 16 avril 2026.

¹²⁰ “*Avant la fin de l’été, vous [les Haïtiens] devez avoir tout le monde, tout l’équipement de partout dans le monde, tous les soldats de partout dans le monde, et tout doit être pleinement opérationnel [...] vous déplacez des soldats de Mongolie, du Tchad, du Sri Lanka, entre autres pays, d’Amérique Centrale également. Vous déplacez des soldats. Vous déplacez de l’équipement — très lourd, du gros équipement, pas seulement, vous savez, vos bottes et votre casque, mais beaucoup d’équipement militaire lourd. Tout ça doit affluer en Haïti, dont l’aéroport est fermé, n’est-ce pas ? C’est compliqué, mais ça avance*” [French original – free translation]: *Ibid.*

outside the country's political and economic fabric. They are an integral part of it".¹²¹ The GSF must therefore remain a tool within a broader strategy aimed at severing the links between criminal violence and political power. Otherwise, there is a risk that the GSF will repeat the mistakes of the past: achieving tactical successes that temporarily weaken criminal groups without sufficiently disrupting the networks that sustain them. These networks could then re-emerge, as they did less than ten years after MINUSTAH's departure, with greater strength and resources.¹²²

This political effort to consolidate state institutions lies at the heart of BINUH's mandate. It must also be accompanied by efforts to "*clean up*" the political and business spheres and tackle the endemic corruption that undermines the country.¹²³ This requires a substantial strengthening of the judicial system. With the support of international partners such as Canada, France contributes to this effort by supporting the establishment of specialised judicial units dealing with financial and mass crimes.¹²⁴ It is also supporting the UN targeted sanctions regime established under Resolution 2653 of 21 October 2022,¹²⁵ which complements unilateral sanctions regimes, primarily those imposed by the United States and Canada in 2022, as well as those adopted by the Dominican Republic and, since 2023, the European Union.

The GSF model places operational control of military force in the hands of a group of willing states – the SGP – while preserving a degree of UN oversight. Proponents of this arrangement argue that it safeguards the organisation's most valuable asset: its legitimacy.¹²⁶ Ultimately, however, the model will be judged based on what happens on the ground and how the GSF's operations are perceived by the Haitian population. Two reputational risks stand out. First, if the GSF uses force unlawfully or excessively, the UN could be associated with these offensive and lethal operations. Second, if the GSF fails to deliver the effectiveness it promises, the UN could once again be seen as associated with a new failure for the international community.

2.2. A large-scale test amid great power rivalries

At a time when the multilateral system is in crisis, the UN's legitimacy increasingly contested and its effectiveness is being questioned across numerous theatres of operation,¹²⁷ Haiti is one of the few remaining issues on which the Security Council has managed to agree on significant action. This is exemplified by the adoption of Resolution 2793, which authorises the deployment of a new force of 5 500 personnel.¹²⁸ The implementation of this resolution constitutes a three-fold test. First, the GSF will have to demonstrate its value to the Haitian population and authorities. Will it deliver the expected results and enable the authorities to reassert control over areas currently beyond their reach? The

¹²¹ "*ne cherchent pas à renverser l'État ni à s'y substituer, ils ne sont pas extérieurs au tissu politique et économique du pays. Ils en font partie intégrante*" [French original – free translation]: LE COUR GRANDMAISON Romain, "[Perspective | La force seule ne suffira pas à déloger les gangs en Haïti](#)", *loc. cit.*

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ "[Brokers and Patrons: Unstitching Gangs from Haiti's Political Fabric](#)", *Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime*, March 2026.

¹²⁴ CÉSAIRE Michelon, "[Deux pôles judiciaires spécialisés pour lutter contre les crimes financiers complexes et les violences de masse](#)", *Le Nouvelliste*, 21 April 2025.

¹²⁵ "[Resolution 2653 \(2022\)](#)", *UNSC*, S/RES/2653 (2022), 21 October 2022.

¹²⁶ AHMED Bulbul, "[The UN is reinventing peacekeeping – Haiti is the testing ground](#)", *The Conversation*, 11 November 2025.

¹²⁷ FERNANDEZ Julian and HOLEINDRE Jean-Vincent (eds.), *Nation désunies ? La crise du multilatéralisme dans les relations internationales*, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2022.

¹²⁸ LIÉGEOIS Michel, "[L'ONU et le maintien de la paix : défis et prospective](#)", *Note de l'OBG*, 9 April 2025.

GSF's performance will directly contribute to the authorities' ability to organise elections in certain areas of the capital. However, the presence of the GSF must in no way be used by the authorities as a justification for postponing elections, which ultimately remains a sovereign decision. Second, the deployment of the GSF also represents an internal challenge for the UN, particularly as regards its ability to coordinate between the three entities operating on the ground as well as the DPPA and DOS. Finally, the Security Council's capacity to preserve consensus among major powers will also be put to the test. If the GSF brings rapid and visible results, UNSC members may be more inclined to agree on the creation of similar forces in other countries. Conversely, failure could further entrench existing divisions.

2.2.1. The GSF's need to demonstrate its value to the Haitian people and authorities

Haiti's population has grown accustomed to foreign interventions. Yet, despite improvements in the security situation and the organisation of elections in 2016 – the country's most recent – MINUSTAH's 17-year presence left two deep scars on the collective memory: sexual abuse and the cholera epidemic. More recently, the arrival of MSS police officers in June 2022 sparked a wave of hope that quickly faded in the face of the mission's logistical and material difficulties.¹²⁹ Its withdrawal was further overshadowed by allegations of sexual abuse.¹³⁰ The arrival of GSF troops since 1 April 2026 has therefore been met with a certain degree of caution, but not hostility. The mission's acceptance will depend on two factors. First, it will need to deliver tangible results quickly enough to have a meaningful impact on Haitians' daily lives, most importantly by enabling people to return to their neighbourhoods, move around freely, and vote in the general elections scheduled for 2026–2027.

The second factor will be the conduct of troops during operations, with particular attention to sexual abuse and violence. This issue has been prioritised at the highest levels across all the entities involved – BINUH, UNSOH and the GSF – which have put in place extensive preventive measures.¹³¹ However, the risk of cultural misunderstandings among young Chadian troops deployed to Haiti will need to be closely monitored, particularly in light of allegations of misconduct involving Chadian forces in previous operations.¹³² The mission's acceptance, and in turn its ability to deliver results and limit the information attacks that could arise as its performance falls short of expectations, hinges on this.

That said, the particularly dire situation faced by a large portion of the population of Port-au-Prince – displaced, unable to move freely, deprived of opportunities to gather, of leisure and access to culture, and under severe financial pressure after seven years of economic recession – appears to pave the way for a favourable reception of GSF's deployment. The same holds true among intellectual circles. Geographer Jean-Marie Théodat, for instance, has spoken out about his support of the mission on several occasions.¹³³ Despite of this conducive environment, failure by the GSF risks fuelling the already sensitive and highly topical debate over host-state consent to international operations.¹³⁴

¹²⁹ PIERCIN Wethzer, "[Comprendre l'échec de la force kényane en Haïti](#)", *Ayibopost*, 22 October 2025.

¹³⁰ COTRINO Nathalie, "[International force in Haiti Allegedly Responsible for Sexual Violence](#)", *Human Rights Watch*, 13 April 2026.

¹³¹ Interview with a GSF executive, conducted in Port-au-Prince on 21 April 2026.

¹³² LE CAM Morgane, "[Sahel : les accusations de viols commis par des soldats tchadiens fragilisent la Force conjointe du G5](#)", *Le Monde*, 12 April 2021.

¹³³ "[Haïti: le déploiement des 'Tchadiens est pour nous le signe qu'on n'a pas fait appel à des amateurs'](#)", *RFI*, 23 April 2026.

¹³⁴ BAYET Camille, "[L'ONU face au défi du consentement des États hôtes d'opération de paix](#)", *loc. cit.*

2.2.2. An internal challenge for the UN

Resolution 2793 represents, especially in the eyes of the US administration, a test of the UN's credibility. It offers the organisation a new opportunity to demonstrate its capacities and effectiveness, provided that it can deliver rapid and visible results with tangible effects, ultimately reflected in the ability to hold elections. Internally, this amounts to a two-level test: at Headquarters and in the field.

At Headquarters, the creation of UNSOH has given the DOS a major opportunity to take a leading role in the new architecture established by Resolution 2793. From the outset, UNSOH has been allocated a substantial budget and staffing level. It is materially better resourced than BINUH, which has also had to transfer all of its administrative services to UNSOH. UNSOH must now demonstrate its logistical effectiveness by preparing for the arrival of the GSF's 5 500 personnel, meeting their needs during operations, and ensuring the functioning of its headquarters and civilian component. Its success will have direct bearing on the role and growing influence of DOS in peacekeeping more generally. This mindset is reflected among UNSOH staff, who are driven by a strong focus on efficiency and by the momentum of a well-resourced mission in its launch phase.

These features are less readily apparent in the case of BINUH, whose political work and good offices are generally conducted behind the scenes, focused on the long term, and carried out discreetly out of respect for the sovereignty of the host state. Nevertheless, the renewal of BINUH's mandate on 30 January 2026 strengthened its role in supporting the electoral process and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), two areas that are particularly central to addressing Haiti's crisis.

Although the mandates of BINUH and UNSOH are clearly distinct, the two missions must maintain close and continuous coordination in the field. This is particularly important because some functions are formally included in the mandates of both missions. Both, for instance, will have a dedicated human rights team. BINUH is tasked with monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation in Haiti, as well as providing training to defence and security forces on the matter. The UNSOH team, for its part, will be entrusted with implementing and monitoring the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) across UNSOH risks associated with each activity requested by the GSF, in order to determine whether and how UNSOH can provide the requested support while ensuring compliance with human rights standards. It is also worth noting that GSF will equally have its own human rights section, responsible, among other things, for investigating allegations of human rights violations involving its personnel. The three heads of mission will therefore be responsible for ensuring that these sections do not duplicate one another. They will need to ensure that their communications remain strictly aligned with their respective mandates and that the same interlocutors are not approached in an uncoordinated manner. The same consideration will apply to the political sections of the three entities. While each has a role in reporting to its respective chain of command, only BINUH has a mandate to support the political process and provide good offices. The GSF's political section has no purpose beyond informing its Special Representative. It will need to avoid creating the impression of a proliferation of international interlocutors among the Haitian authorities, which could further add to the confusion surrounding the new architecture among those already somewhat unsettled by it.¹³⁵

¹³⁵ GEFFRARD Robenson, "[Le CEP rencontre le directeur politique de la Force de répression des gangs en Haïti](#)", *Le Nouvelliste*, 4 May 2026.

2.2.3. A test for the Security Council

Against the backdrop of a multilateral system in crisis and a deadlocked Security Council, with no new mission established since 2014, reaching consensus on the mandate set out in Resolution 2793 was a significant challenge.

If the GSF succeeds in passing the first two tests, the final stage will play out at the level of the Security Council. The United States holds a central role in the Haiti file. Located just 1 300 kilometres off the coast of Florida, Haiti is the only country in crisis in the Americas and the Western Hemisphere. It consequently occupies an important place on the US agenda and has received close attention from Secretary of State Marco Rubio.¹³⁶ Securing support for the GSF required the United States to make some concessions to its otherwise highly critical stance towards the UN, expressed particularly bluntly by President Trump in his 2025 address to the General Assembly, when he described the UN as “useless”.¹³⁷

To secure the adoption of the resolution, the United States made a number of concessions, particularly to China. China’s interest in Haiti is largely focused on encouraging the Haitian authorities to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan, which it has recognised over 70 years ago. However, given the current political context in the United States, China has so far refrained from pressing the issue. For all these reasons, the United States hopes that the adoption of Resolution 2793 will mark a new chapter for the UN, demonstrating that it can be effective, well-structured and cost-efficient. If this does not materialise, Haiti could further fuel current US scepticism towards multilateralism. In its efforts to secure the renewal of the resolution, the United States has benefited from the active support of the United Kingdom and, particularly, France, which has been closely involved in the Haiti file at the UNSC.

China and Russia, by contrast, have adopted a more wait-and-see approach to the GSF’s deployment, which they have nonetheless allowed to proceed. They view Haiti primarily as a matter of concern for the United States, given its geographical proximity and the historical legacy of the US occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934. Both powers were receptive to approaches from Latin American countries and the Dominican Republic urging them not to object to the GSF’s deployment. Their abstention, however, leaves China and Russia with a card they can play to thwart further US involvement in Haiti when the GSF’s mandate comes up for renewal. If the tripartite architecture described in this paper fails to deliver results, or if the GSF commits abuses or exceeds its mandate, the reconduction of its mandate could simply fail to secure a vote in October.

Conclusion

The simultaneous establishment of the GSF and UNSOH through the adoption of Resolution 2793, alongside the existing BINUH, creates a tripartite architecture. Monitoring its actions and shortcomings will be essential to assess the overall record of this arrangement and its added value. In retrospect, this architecture can be seen as resembling that of a traditional peacekeeping operation whose components have been separated and decoupled to form three distinct and independent entities.

BINUH gathers all the so-called substantive sections of a peacekeeping operation, while UNSOH corresponds to what traditionally falls under the logistical wing (known as the “Mission Support Department”) and the GSF embodies the Force component. Each have their own chain of command:

¹³⁶ SÉNAT Jean-Daniel, “[Le secrétaire d’État Rubio reçoit Fils-Aimé à Washington et salue les avancées sécuritaires en Haïti](#)”, *Le Nouvelliste*, 21 April 2026.

¹³⁷ LYNCH James, “[Trump Rips U.N. as Useless During General Assembly Address: ‘Empty Words’](#)”, *National Review*, 23 September 2025.

BINUH reports to the DPPA, UNSOH to the DOS, and GSF to the SGP (a sort of *ad hoc* steering committee), before ultimately reporting to the UNSC.

This fragmented structure could be described as the operational manifestation of the divisions riving the Security Council, in line with the logic of “power rivalries” described by Arthur Boutellis. It confirms the declining appeal of the multidimensional operation model – a trend observed for several year now – whilst offering a complementary tool to such operations.

This alternative effectively strengthens the role of DOS. The UN concentrates its resources more heavily on logistical and technical issues. Transporting troops and equipment and setting up camps is a logistical challenge for which results are relatively easy to achieve and measure. This is quite different from supporting a political process, where progress is often more difficult to demonstrate in concrete and visible terms. This new model also seeks to dissociate the use of force from the principles of peacekeeping, particularly the principle of non-use of force except in self-defence, which is too often invoked to explain the inaction of peacekeepers in the field despite mandates presented as robust. By establishing the GSF, it places deployed military personnel in an offensive posture and explicitly prepares them to use force. This is a particularly significant development in UN multilateralism.

Moreover, interviews conducted on the ground suggest that the UNSG’s offices are attempting, through a form of natural polarity, to re-establish the bridges and connections necessary for the smooth functioning of the three entities. This process is facilitated within the GSF by the fact that the majority of its civilian component consists of UN staff from operational missions. Foremost among them its Special Representative, Jack Christofidès, who has spent his entire career at the United Nations. Another important element is that this new approach is entirely short-term in focus; the initial prospect being of a two-year mission as of the date the GSF’s full deployment. Resolution 2793 even lays the groundwork, from the outset, for the conditions of the GSF’s withdrawal in order to better anticipate the consequences of its departure.¹³⁸ At France’s particular request, the resolution therefore instructs the UNSG “to develop, in coordination with the Haitian authorities, and report to the Security Council, within three months of the adoption of this resolution, on benchmarks, indicators and dates to be met by the Haitian authorities in order to increase the security forces capacities of Haiti and enhance Haiti’s management and control of its land, maritime and air borders and ports to combat illicit trafficking of arms, ammunitions and narcotics, with the goal of preparing the transition of tasks and responsibilities to the Government of Haiti”.¹³⁹ In other words, the resolution calls for a strategy to ensure that the Haitian authorities have acquired sufficient personnel and capabilities for the GSF to withdraw without creating a *security vacuum*. A security-focused approach alone will not be sufficient to resolve the crisis. However, the reversal of the balance of power – to the detriment of the gangs and in favour of the international forces and the national police – must mark the beginning of a new dynamic, which must incorporate surrender mechanisms, including those adapted for minors, a national DDR strategy, and a judicial crackdown on corruption and trafficking networks.

The GSF walks a fine line. Operationally, it shares with the private military company contracted by the Haitian State the same objective of combating criminal gangs. Yet, for reasons of ethics and accountability, it cannot—and must not—under any circumstances cooperate with it. On the other hand, logistically, the GSF is entirely dependent on the United Nations, even though it must not be conflated with a UN mission. Resolution 2793 entrusts the GSF with a delicate balancing act. Its success or failure could further undermine the credibility of the Security Council and have significant

¹³⁸ LIÉGEOIS Michel, “[L’ONU et le maintien de la paix](#)”, *loc. cit.*

¹³⁹ “[Resolution 2793 \(2025\)](#)”, *loc. cit.*, art. 24.

implications for the role the UN may be able to play at a time when its legitimacy, functioning and usefulness are increasingly being called into question.

Recommendations

The drafting of this note was completed at the end of July 2026, when the GSF was not yet fully operational. Several contingents were still due to arrive in Haiti, and its headquarters and civilian component were still in the process of being staffed. As a consequence, the recommendations set out below focus solely on issues relating to the establishment of the GSF and the functioning of the SGP, with a view to ensuring that the force can begin operations under the best possible conditions. A first review of the operations, together with the corresponding recommendations, should be undertaken in the second half of 2027, in light of the experience gained.

- As a joint initiative, France and Germany, with the support of the European Union (EU), could seek to join the SGP. France could do so in recognition of its active role and presence in the region, while Germany's participation could be justified by its substantial contribution to the trust fund and by the presence of a German national as Head of UNSOH. A joint seat would also provide a means of representing other European contributors to the trust fund (Spain, Italy, Denmark, Austria and Greece), as well as the EU who has contributed 10 million USD through a separate channel. Finally, this initiative would give concrete expression to the "*Team Europe*" format within the SGP.
- Grant the GSF legal personality in order to provide it with the capacity and autonomy required to enter into commitments in its own name and to ensure that its personnel benefits, without the involvement of the OAS, from the immunities afforded to international organisations.
- Ensure heightened vigilance by the GSF Special Representative to prevent the force from being politically instrumentalised, particularly in connection with preparations for the electoral timetable.
- Develop a *modus operandi* for coordination between the GSF and humanitarian actors in order to prevent and anticipate the consequences of offensive operations.
- Formalise the use of artificial intelligence to facilitate communication among the national contingents within the GSF, including Arabic-, French-, English- and Mongolian-speaking personnel, as well as communication with the Haitian defence and security forces.
- Accelerate the establishment of a fully-fledged intelligence capability, drawing on a network of human intelligence sources, open-source intelligence analysts and experts with advanced technical capabilities, so that the GSF can operate independently in collecting information and rapidly conduct intelligence-led operations.
- Establish a lasting and trust-based working relationship with the HNP and the Armed Forces.
- Consolidate and extend coordination mechanisms among the three entities—UNSOH, BINUH and the GSF—at multiple levels, including at the field level.
- Ensure that UNSOH neither encroaches upon nor duplicates BINUH's political mandate, as BINUH is the sole entity mandated to support the Haitian authorities and provide good offices.
- Strengthen ties between the Haitian authorities and troop-contributing countries in order to foster greater national ownership of the GSF framework.

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The Boutros-Ghali Observatory on Peacekeeping is a forum for discussion between experts and French-speaking personalities from troop-and-police-contributing countries. It contributes to strengthening triangular dialogue between Member States engaged in peacekeeping, the UN Security Council, and the UN Secretariat.

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