



Flexibility and adaptability of UN missions: UNIFIL between opportunities and contextual limitations

Annexes

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Annex 1 – Chronology of relations between Israel and Lebanon and the evolution of UNIFIL

This chronology is essentially derived from the one presented in the *Libanews* journal.¹ A few elements have been added in order to situate certain developments in the broader context of political changes in Lebanon.

1948-1949: Lebanon's symbolic participation in the first Arab-Israeli war

31 October 1948: Massacre in Houla, where Israeli forces kill nearly 80 Lebanese civilians.

1949: Signing of the armistice between Israel and Lebanon; over the years, Lebanese villagers denounce multiple incursions and territorial infringements without any response from the government.

December 1968: In retaliation for an attack by Palestinian activists on an Israeli aircraft in Athens, Israel bombs Beirut International Airport, destroying 13 airliners.

1970: After being expelled from Jordan (Black September), the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) settles in Lebanon, where it launches cross-border attacks against Israel; the border becomes increasingly volatile.

April 1973: Israel conducts a raid against Palestinian PLO leaders in Beirut, marking an escalation in Israeli reprisals. Outcome: several PLO leaders are killed.

1975-1990: Lebanese civil war and Israeli invasions.

1978:

- Operation Litani: Israel launches a limited invasion of south Lebanon to push PLO militants back over the Litani River. Outcome: approximately 1,100 Lebanese civilians killed and 200,000 displaced.
- Establishment of UNIFIL

1982:

- Israeli invasion – Operation Peace for Galilee: Israel invades Lebanon to expel the PLO from Beirut. Outcome: approximately 17,825 Lebanese killed, mainly civilians, and approximately 500 Israeli soldiers killed.
- Sabra and Shatila massacres: 800 to 3,500 Palestinian refugees are massacred by Christian militias supported by Israel.
- Hezbollah is founded in the aftermath of Israel's occupation of Lebanon.
- Creation of a multinational force composed of American, British, French and Italian troops, among others.

October 1983: French and American contingents are targeted by suicide bombings; the contingents leave the country shortly afterwards.

22 October 1989: adoption of the Taif Agreement, intended to end the Lebanese civil war, under international pressure; it is followed by a new episode of violence between: internally, the Lebanese Forces militia (Christian) and a section of the Lebanese army led by the General Michel Aoun

¹ "[Chronologie exhaustive des actes de guerre et des opérations israéliennes contre le Liban \(1948 – 2024\)](#)", *Libanews*, 19 September 2024.

(appointed interim president following Amine Gemayel's term of office); externally: the brigades under Michel Aoun's command and Syrian troops.

13 October 1990: in the aftermath of the 1st Gulf War, the Lebanese civil war ended with the defeat of the Lebanese armed forces under the command of Michel Aoun. Syria occupies most parts of Lebanon and rules as a guardian power. Israel continues to occupy south Lebanon.

25-31 July 1993: In response to Hezbollah attacks on the Israeli-occupied zone in south Lebanon, Israel launches a military operation ("*Justice Served*") against south Lebanon. Outcome: 120 civilians killed and around 300,000 displaced.

11-27 April 1996: As part of its Operation *Grapes of Wrath*, Israel heavily bombs south Lebanon and strikes a UN base in Qana, killing more than 100 civilians. Outcome: 154 Lebanese and approximately 16 Israelis killed.

May 2000: After 18 years of occupation, Israel withdrew from south Lebanon under military pressure from Hezbollah. The result: Israel left Lebanon after losing approximately 1,200 soldiers during the occupation.

12 July 2006: Hezbollah captures two Israeli soldiers, triggering a 34-day war. The result: 1,200 Lebanese dead (most of them civilians) and 165 Israelis dead. Massive destruction in Lebanon, particularly in Beirut and in the south. Consequences: The war ends with a UN-brokered ceasefire (Resolution 1701), but Hezbollah strengthens its status as a "*resistance*" group.

11 August 2006: Adoption of Resolution 1701, which strengthens UNIFIL and its mandate.

2006-2020: Hezbollah grows stronger militarily and politically, with the support of Iran and Syria. Outcome: Border skirmishes occur, but no major conflict breaks out. Israel strikes Hezbollah more frequently in Syria than in Lebanon.

2023: Intensification of fighting between Israel and Palestinian factions, particularly in Gaza, with direct implications for the Israeli-Lebanese border.

May 2023: Hezbollah fires several rockets in response to Israeli raids on Gaza. Israel retaliates by striking suspected Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon. Outcome: no detailed casualty figures are released, but several Hezbollah military positions are hit, without triggering a large-scale conflict.

August 2023: Tensions peak at the end of summer 2023, with a series of cross-border exchanges of fire. Israel launches a drone attack on suspected Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon. Hezbollah responds by firing rockets into northern Israel. Outcome: A few minor injuries on the Israeli side, while several Hezbollah fighters are killed or wounded. Civilian infrastructure in northern Israel suffers minor damage.

September 2023: In anticipation of a potential escalation, Hezbollah strengthens its presence in south Lebanon, increasing its personnel and stepping up patrols along the border. Israeli media report that Hezbollah military convoys have been spotted in the region and that underground infrastructure is being expanded.

Annex 2 - Brief chronology of events marking the Israeli-Lebanese front since October 2023

This chronology partly follows the one presented in the newspaper *Libanews*,² highlighting the elements considered by the author to have signalled an intensification of hostilities and extending beyond September 2024.

7 October 2023: Against the backdrop of a total breakdown in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Hamas carries out bloody attacks on Israeli territory, killing nearly 1,200 people, injuring more than 3,000 and taking nearly 250 hostages.

8 October 2023: Israel launches an all-out war against the Gaza Strip; Hezbollah opens a "*support front*" on Israel's northern border.

13 October 2023: Israeli strikes deliberately target journalists in south Lebanon, killing Issam Abdallah, who worked for *Reuters*, and injuring three others.

21 November 2023: Two journalists and their guide are killed in an Israeli strike. Two civilians die in another strike.

24-30 November 2023: Temporary truce on both sides of the Blue Line (BL) linked to the ceasefire in Gaza.

1st December 2023: Resumption of the Israeli offensive on all fronts in the Gaza Strip and, as a result, cross-border attacks between Israel and Hezbollah.

2 January 2024: Assassination of Saleh al-Aroui, number two in Hamas' political bureau, in an Israeli drone strike in the southern suburbs of Beirut, a Hezbollah stronghold; Hezbollah expands its attacks in response.

1st April 2024: Israel bombs the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killing officials from the Revolutionary Guards. Hezbollah intensifies its attacks in response.

27 July 2024: Twelve children and young people are killed in the Syrian town of Majed Shams, located in the occupied Golan Heights; Israel blames Hezbollah for the attack; Lebanon calls in vain for an independent international investigation to establish responsibility.

30 July 2024: Fouad Chokr, one of the most senior figures in Hezbollah's military wing, is assassinated in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

31 July 2024: Assassination in Tehran of the head of Hamas' political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, during the inauguration of the new reformist Iranian president, Massoud Pezeshkian.

25 August 2024: Hezbollah launches hundreds of drones and rockets at Israel to avenge Chokr's assassination.

17 September 2024: Simultaneous explosion of thousands of pagers used by Hezbollah.

18 September 2024: Simultaneous explosion of thousands of *walkie-talkies* used by Hezbollah.

24 September 2024: Israel begins an all-out bombing campaign on many regions of Lebanon.

² "[Chronologie complète des événements entre le Liban et Israël \(Octobre 2023 – Septembre 2024\)](#)", *Libanews*, 19 September 2024.

27 September 2024: Assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, by Israeli strikes in the southern suburbs of Beirut, which destroy several blocks of buildings.

30 September 2024: Announcement and start of limited ground incursions.

27 November 2024: A cessation of hostilities negotiated by Washington comes into effect.

This cessation of hostilities is largely respected on the Lebanese side (with a few minor strikes in early December 2024, then in March and April 2025). However, Israeli attacks remain constant and tend to intensify in the autumn of 2025. See Annexes 4 to 8.


Annex 3 – Cross-border attacks between Israel and Hezbollah between October 2023 and the entry into force of the cessation of hostilities (COH) in November 2024

The five maps and graphs below show the evolution of cross-border attacks on both sides of the Blue Line, as well as the respective shares of each of the two sides (Israel/Hezbollah and other militias on the other side).

The first three cover the period prior to the escalation in September 2024.


The last two show the exponential increase in strikes, particularly by Israel, from the last week of September 2024 and during the acute phase of the crisis.

Map 1 – Attacks on both sides of the Blue Line, from 7 October 2023 to 20 September 2024³




³ HUSSEIN Mohamad, DUGGAL Hanna, "[Mapping over a year of cross-border attacks between Israel and Lebanon](#)", *Al Jazeera*, 13 October 2024.

Figure 1 – Chronology of attacks between Israel and Lebanon from 7 October 2023 to 20 September 2024⁴




⁴ Ibid.

Graph 1 – Weekly trajectories of projectiles observed by UNIFIL from 8 October 2023 to 15 June 2024⁵




Graph 2 – Weekly trajectories of projectiles observed by UNIFIL between June and October 2024⁶



⁵ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2024. Report of the Secretary-General”, UNSC, S/2024/548, 12 July 2024, p. 2.](#)

⁶ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2024. Report of the Secretary-General”, UNSC, S/2024/817, 13 November 2024, p. 2.](#)

Graph 3 – Daily trajectories of projectiles observed by UNIFIL between October and November 2024⁷




⁷ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025. Report of the Secretary-General”, UNSC, S/2025/153, 12 March 2025, p. 2.](#)

Annex 4 – Cross-border attacks between Israel and Hezbollah after the entry into force of the cessation of hostilities


The various figures below illustrate the continued Israeli attacks after the COH, as well as the sustained nature of the attacks on the Lebanese side.

Graph 1 – Daily trajectories of projectiles observed by UNIFIL between November 2024 and February 2025⁸




⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Graph 2 – Trajectories of projectiles observed by UNIFIL between 21 February and 20 June 2025⁹



Graph 3 - Trajectories of projectiles observed by UNIFIL between 21 June and 20 October 2025¹⁰




⁹ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025. Report of the Secretary-General”, UNSC, S/2025/460, 11 July 2025, p. 2.](#)

¹⁰ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2025. Report of the Secretary-General”, UNSC, S/2025/738, 11 November 2025, p. 2.](#)

Annex 5 - Violent incidents between Hezbollah and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) between October 2023 and September 2025

The following two figures provide a more complete picture of the evolution of strikes on both sides of the Blue Line and the periods of fighting.

Map 1 – Geographical distribution of violent incidents between Hezbollah and the IDF between 8 October 2023 and 26 September 2025¹¹




¹¹ MARCO Ana, "[Two years since 7 October: Israel's forever wars across the Middle East](#)", ACLED, 7 October 2025.

Graph 1 – Violent incidents per week between Hezbollah and the IDF between 8 October 2023 and 26 September 2025¹²

Weekly violent events between Hezbollah and the IDF from 8 October 2023 until 26 September 2025

Armed clash Hezbollah actions Interceptions by Israel Israel actions




¹² Ibid.

Annex 6 - Violations of Lebanese airspace by Israel (between June 2024 and October 2025)

The figures below do not include the period from February to June 2025, during which "UNIFIL detected 2,318 violations of Lebanese airspace, for a total overflight time of 4,294 hours and 31 minutes".¹³


Graph 1 – Violations of Lebanese airspace by the IDF detected by UNIFIL between June and October 2024¹⁴




¹³ ["Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025."](#), *loc. cit.*, §17.

¹⁴ ["Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2024."](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 6.

Graph 2 – Violations of Lebanese airspace by the IDF detected by UNIFIL between October 2024 and February 2025¹⁵



Graph 3 – Violations of Lebanese airspace by the IDF detected by UNIFIL between 21 June and 20 October 2025¹⁶




¹⁵ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025.”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁶ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2025.”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 5.


Annex 7 – Israeli air strikes in Lebanon (before and after the entry into force of the COH)

Graph 1 – Air attacks carried out in Lebanon by the IDF detected by UNIFIL between June and October 2024¹⁷




¹⁷ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2024.”, loc. cit., p. 6.](#)

Graph 2 – IDF weekly air attacks in Lebanon detected by UNIFIL between October 2024 and February 2025¹⁸




Graph 3 – IDF weekly air attacks in Lebanon detected by UNIFIL between 21 February and 20 June 2025¹⁹



¹⁸ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025.”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁹ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025.”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 3.

Graph 4 – IDF weekly air attacks in Lebanon detected by UNIFIL between 21 June and 20 October 2025²⁰




²⁰ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2025.”, loc. cit., p. 3.](#)

Annex 8 – UNIFIL operational activities between March 2023 and February 2025

These figures produced by UNIFIL show the evolution of UNIFIL's operational activities, and in particular their decline during the most acute phase of the conflict (September to November 2024).

In the Secretary-General's reports of July and November 2025, UNIFIL's operational activities are no longer represented by graphs. It should be noted, however, that the report covering the period from February to June 2025 mentions an average of 4,356 operational activities per month;²¹ the report covering the period from June to October 2025 mentions a monthly average of 6,848 operational activities, with a peak in August of 7,864 activities.²²

Graph 1 – UNIFIL operational activities between March 2023 and 20 June 2024²³




²¹ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025.”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 11.


²² [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2025.”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 12.

²³ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2024.”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 6.

Graph 2 – UNIFIL operational activities between June and October 2024²⁴



Graph 3 – UNIFIL operational activities between October 2024 and February 2025²⁵



²⁴ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2024.”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 8.

²⁵ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025.”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 8.


Annex 9 – Incidents related to UNIFIL's freedom of movement and impacts on personnel and positions between June 2024 and October 2025

The figures below show incidents related to freedom of movement or impacts on UNIFIL personnel and positions from June 2024 onwards (incidents prior to this period are not available in graphic form).

The first two figures distinguish between incidents related to movement and those constituting attacks on UNIFIL positions and personnel.


The last two figures distinguish between incidents caused by Lebanese parties and those caused by the Israeli army.

Graph 1 – Impeding UNIFIL's freedom of movement and impacts on Force personnel and positions between 21 June and 20 October 2024²⁶




²⁶ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2024.”, loc. cit., p. 27.](#)

Graph 2 – Restrictions on UNIFIL freedom of movement and impact on personnel and Force positions between 20 October 2024 and February 2025²⁷




Graph 3 – Impairments to UNIFIL freedom of movement between 21 February and 20 June 2025²⁸



²⁷ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025.”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 28.

²⁸ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025.”](#), *loc. cit.*, p. 18.


Graph 4 – Impeding UNIFIL's freedom of movement between June and October 2025²⁹



²⁹ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2025.”, loc. cit., p. 18.](#)


Annex 10 – Caches of weapons discovered by UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces (after March 2025)

Graph 1 – Unauthorised weapons caches discovered by UNIFIL in south Lebanon and removed by the LAF between 21 February and 20 June 2025³⁰



³⁰ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025.”, loc. cit., p. 7.](#)

Graph 2 – Unauthorised weapons caches discovered by UNIFIL in south Lebanon and removed by the LAF between 21 June and 20 October 2025³¹



³¹ [“Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 \(2006\) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2025.”, loc. cit., p. 6.](#)