



Summary document :

Strengthening the francophone contribution to peace operations

Avenues for reflection
on a cooperative and pooled approach

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Translation

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Introductory Remark

This summary document, published in 2025, provides an overview of the main avenues for reflection that have emerged over the past four years of activities of the Observatory. It offers a comprehensive perspective of reflections developed through our publications and newsletter editorials, as well as during seminars and informal exchanges, which have given a voice to francophone experts and peacekeeping practitioners.

It is a direct follow-up to a first synthesis published in December 2020, titled "[Pistes pour renforcer la contribution francophone aux OP](#)" (*"Tracks and proposals to strengthen the francophone contribution to peace operations"* - edited by Federico Santopinto, December 2020), which summarized the lessons learned from the first four years of the Observatory's activities (2017-2020). That publication highlighted the discrepancy between the number of major peace operations deployed in francophone contexts (3 at the time) and the limited number of French-speaking countries contributing troops to them. It identified concrete obstacles to the contribution of francophone states to peace operations and proposed possible solutions. The obstacles identified were both politico-administrative (e.g. limited use of French as a working language at the United Nations (UN), insufficient number of French-speaking staff within the UN services able to support contributing countries, and limited familiarity of national administrations with UN procedures) and technical operational (e.g. the UN's growing demand for increasingly specialized equipment and personnel, limited capacity of countries to implement new training, lack of funding).

Although most findings and recommendations identified by this first document remain relevant and valid at the outset of 2025, there is a need to enrich and complement them with additional lessons learned, further reflections, and approaches adapted to the evolving context. This document adopts a similar structure to ensure continuity between the two works.

Executive Summary

This note is primarily addressed to a group of 24 francophone troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs), to their personnel deployed in peace operations (representing 23.35% of uniformed personnel deployed as of July 2025), and to their diplomatic teams. It is also intended more broadly for UN personnel serving in missions and within the Secretariat (New York), the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF), academic researchers, and other civil society actors.

Francophone contributing countries face structural obstacles that limit their ability to contribute fully to the peacekeeping system. On the one hand, these obstacles are of an operational and technical nature. They include difficulties in meeting the increasingly sophisticated technical requirements that the UN sets (in terms of both equipment and highly specialized personnel), a lack of financial and human resources for troop training, limited availability of training materials in French, and so on. On the other hand, they are also administrative and political: challenges in navigating UN administrative procedures (often conducted exclusively in English), shortcomings in monitoring the evolution of UN norms and standards, and a deficit of influence over political decisions related to peacekeeping. In addition to these structural obstacles, there is now a political and security context marked by uncertainty. Whilst the UN seeks to reform its peacekeeping mechanisms to make it more resilient and adaptable to the volatility of deployment environments, it is also facing an unprecedented financial and budgetary crisis, leading to reductions in the military and police components of missions. This situation complicates the ability of T/PCCs to effectively position themselves within the system. To mitigate these challenges, it is essential for these states to be able to make their voices heard in the political and administrative processes that shape and define UN peacekeeping practices.

This note explores opportunities for pooling resources and networking among francophone actors to jointly strengthen their capacities and share the associated costs, while also enhancing the reach and impact of their voices in relevant decision-making forums. This document is structured in two parts: the operational axis and the political axis. It comprises ten areas for reflection, which have led to the formulation of more than twenty concrete recommendations, primarily intended for T/PCCs and reproduced here in a non-exhaustive manner:

Short-term recommendations

Operational Axis	Political Axis
<div>➤ Use the new UN Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) now available in French (November 2025)</div> <div>➤ Leverage online resources (websites, training, mobile applications) made available in French by the Secretariat, UNITAR or associations such as POTI</div> <div>➤ Support the dissemination of free French-language learning tools such as the “En Avant!” method, Lexicopaix, and Lexikozé</div>	<div>➤ Jointly prepare for the upcoming meeting of the Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment (January 2026) to share diplomatic and technical efforts</div> <div>➤ Identify areas of political convergence among francophone actors, such as the importance of multilingualism, within the framework of the Review of the Future of All Forms of Peace Operations, which will conclude in 2026</div>

Medium- and long-term recommendations

Operational Axis	Political Axis
<ul style="list-style-type: none">➤ Improve the offer of peace operations training delivered in French:<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In terms of content – by developing training courses on specialized thematic areas in demand by the UN• In terms of format – by promoting digital tools, interactive training, and stronger pedagogical approaches➤ Strengthen links among training centres, and through associations such as IAPTC, APSTA or REFFOP➤ Take initiatives in the development and/or translation of training materials made available by the UN and the AU, and encourage both organizations to expand the range of resources available in French	<ul style="list-style-type: none">➤ Promote, where and when appropriate, coordinated and coherent diplomatic action by francophone Member States vis-à-vis the UN and the AU➤ Strengthen ties with non-diplomatic actors capable of supporting political engagement (former UN personnel, think tanks, military and police experts, etc.)

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List of acronyms

A4P	Action for Peacekeeping
APSTA	African Peace Support Trainers Association
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
C-34	Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CAR	Central African Republic
C4ISR	Command– Control – Communication – Computer – Intelligence – Surveillance – Reconnaissance
CCCPA	Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding
COE	Contingent-owned equipment
CPTM	Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials
DCSD*	Directorate for Security and Defence Cooperation (France)
DPO	Department of Peace Operations / formerly Department of Peacekeeping Operations – (DPKO)
DPET	Policy, Evaluation and Training Division
DOS	Department of Operational Support / formerly Department of Field Support (DFS)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GAF*	Group of Francophone Ambassadors
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training
IPI	International Peace Institute
ITS	Integrated Training Service
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
LCM	Light Coordination Mechanism
LCMOS	Light Coordination Mechanism Online System
MEAE*	Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (France)
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Republic of Democratic Republic of Congo
MSS	Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NCDED	Neutralization, Clearance, Destruction of Explosive Devices

OIF*	International Organization of La Francophonie
OMA	Office of Military Affairs
PCRS	Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
PO	UN Peace Operation
POTI	Peace Operation Training Institute
PM	Permanent Mission
PSO	Peace Support Operation (African Union)
QRF	Quick-Reaction Forces
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
REFFOP*	Francophone Network for Expertise and Training in Peace Operations
RETEX*	Experience Feedback
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SME	Subject Matter Experts
TOT	Training of Trainers
T/PCCs	Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries
TPP	Triangular Partnership Programme
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSSC	United Nations System Staff College
USIP	United States Institute for Peace

* The text uses, when relevant, the French acronym. English acronyms rely on the list established by the UN in its Pre-Deployment Training (CPTM) Material, [Annex 1](#).

Introduction

The year 2026 will likely become a pivotal year for the future of UN peacekeeping, which is undergoing unprecedented structural changes in the 21st century. On the one hand, this international instrument must confront major inner difficulties, both in the field and at headquarters. In the field, the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) at the request of Mali represents a significant challenge. At headquarters, tensions within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the body that mandates all UN peace operations (POs), present another obstacle. On the other hand, the UN has initiated a series of political and strategic initiatives and innovations, including resolution 2719 (2023), which paved the way for the UN financial support to African Union (AU) peace support operations¹. In seeking to rethink the frameworks for its peace action, the UN endorsed its new *Pact for the Future* in 2024² and began substantive discussions on a potential broader reform of its peace and security pillar. The UN Secretariat's Review on the Future of All Forms of Peace Operations will likely culminate these discussions in 2026³.

At the same time, the international organization has also been facing a budgetary and financial crisis that has worsened since the beginning of 2025. This is partly because of the United States' partial financial disengagement. The United States has historically contributed the most financially to the UN. The liquidity crisis, a reduction in the number of peacekeepers deployed, and cuts in civilian staff have greatly complicated the day-to-day management of the POs' work. In response, the UN Secretary-General announced in March 2025 the UN80 initiative, aimed at rethinking its financial management, operational structures, and human and material resources in a more integrated manner⁴.

For the francophone member states providing uniformed personnel to these missions, this situation raises many questions as per the nature and evolution of their contribution to the peacekeeping mechanism. These countries – known as Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries T/PCCs - must now position themselves within multi-level contribution frameworks (UN, AU and subregional organizations) all the while accounting for new field risks (improvised explosive devices, disinformation and misinformation, environmental hazards, etc.) which often require them to continuously renew their practices and adapt their capacities. Achieving such agility is far from being straightforward. It requires significant preparatory work on the part of T/PCCs in preparing, training and equipping their personnel to guarantee both good conduct and mission effectiveness. To that end, it is essential that these states engage not only with ongoing reflections on the future of peacekeeping but also, more broadly, with the capability standards, administrative processes, and institutional mechanisms that will define tomorrow's peacekeeping operations.

¹ For more information: LIEGEOIS Michel, "[L'ONU et le maintien de la paix : défis et prospective](#)", *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)*, April 2025.

² "[Pact for the Future](#)", *United Nations General Assembly*, A/RES/79/1, 22 September 2024.

³ See in particular: WANE El-Ghassim, WILLIAMS Paul D., KIHARA-HUNT Ai, "[The future of peacekeeping, new models and related capabilities](#)", *UN*, United Nations Department of Peace Operations, October 2024, French version : « [L'avenir du maintien de la paix, nouveaux modèles et capacités connexes](#) », January 2025.

⁴ "[Avec l'initiative UN80, les Nations unies envisagent une réforme structurelle majeure pour faire face aux contraintes budgétaires](#) », *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)*, May 2025 .

In the current multilateral context, francophone T/PCCs – which lie at the heart of the Observatory's work – are facing a delicate situation. They must be able to structure long-term strategic action (preparation of troops, investment in equipment, acquisition of new skills, etc.), while considering the political, economic and administrative uncertainties that are currently affecting the UN.

Though most of the proposals put forward in the Observatory's 2020 summary note⁵ remain highly relevant, it was deemed useful to readapt the approach to the current context. This document therefore seeks to identify complementary avenues to support the efforts of current or potential T/PCCs, and, around them, a wide array of French-speaking actors: UN Member States and their diplomatic personnel, their troops deployed in peace operations, current or former UN staff (at headquarters in New York and in the field), academic researchers and think-tank members, as well as intergovernmental organizations such as the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF). This note focuses primarily on opportunities for pooling capacities and tools within the French-speaking sphere. Pooling these resources could facilitate exchanges, enhance personnel's capacity and skills, and strengthen the engagement and influence of francophone actors. These elements could serve as a basis for reflection ahead of the next francophone Peacekeeping Ministerial, which Morocco may host in 2026.

This note also aims to summarize and systematize the many solutions identified through formal and informal exchanges conducted by the Observatory with francophone peacekeeping actors, including discussions during the November 2024 Seminar⁶ and a series of seven interviews with professionals from peace operations, diplomatic representatives, and specialized researchers, who have all been anonymized. It first offers an overview of the francophone contribution (Part 1), and it is then structured around two axes of reflection:

- The " *Political Axis – Amplifying the Voices of Francophone Contributors* " (Part 2): addressed to UN Headquarters, AU Headquarters, and the diplomatic representations of their Member States. It focuses primarily on measures aimed at ensuring the full participation of francophone T/PCCs in strategic peacekeeping discussions at the UN.
- The " *Operational Axis – Strengthening the Training Architecture and francophone Cooperation* " (Part 3): addressed mainly to francophone actors themselves (T/PCCs, peacekeeping training centres, etc.). The measures and suggestions compiled here aim to enhance the capacities of uniformed personnel in the field, particularly through reflections on pre-deployment preparation.

The avenues presented in this policy brief highlight emerging trends and potential opportunities, allowing francophone peacekeeping actors to make use of them if they wish so. Any subsequent actions stemming from these reflections remain the sole prerogative of Member States, the UN, and other stakeholders within the peacekeeping ecosystem.

⁵ SANTOPINTO Federico, "[Pistes et propositions pour renforcer la contribution francophone aux opérations de paix](#)", *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)*, December 2020.

⁶ "[Séminaire de l'Observatoire à New York – Les enjeux de la francophonie dans le maintien de la paix – 20 novembre 2024](#) », *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)*, 2024.

Part 1 – The francophone contribution to peace operations: state of play and initial thoughts

Since 2021, the francophone Network for Expertise and Training in Peace Operations (REFFOP), a project supported by the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF), has been collecting statistical data on francophone T/PCCs' participation in UN peacekeeping. These data provide an estimate based on a list of 36 countries that either 1) have French as an official or co-official language, or 2) can demonstrate a relative prevalence of French within their population. Though this method does not guarantee precise results, it offers an overall estimate of the francophone contribution in uniformed personnel to POs.

Of the 36 countries considered, 24 deploy uniformed personnel to a UN peace operation (see Table 1 attached). In other words, among the 116 countries currently contributing to peacekeeping, nearly 1 in 5 can be considered francophone. In terms of personnel, they represent 14,274 individuals, or 23.35% of the Blue Helmets and UN Police staff deployed worldwide⁸. Several French-speaking African countries rank among the top 20 contributors in terms of the number of troops deployed: Rwanda (2nd), Morocco (9th), Senegal (12th), Cameroon (14th) and Tunisia (18th), far ahead of French-speaking countries from other continents (France - 26th, Canada - 70th, Switzerland - 80th)⁹. Therefore African countries contribute the most in terms of the number of francophone personnel.

Another interesting statistical finding is that the francophone T/PCCs listed here contribute to 70.14% of the United Nations police force (UNPOL)¹⁰. This translates to 4,265 police officers deployed by francophone PCCs, most of whom come from French-speaking African countries. These states have also made efforts to increase the proportion of women in uniform they deploy, in line with the goals of the UN Gender Parity Strategy for Uniformed Personnel (2018-2028)¹¹. As of July 2025, women make up 17% French-speaking police forces; however, they still represent only 8% of French-speaking military

Table 1 - The contribution of francophone T/PCCs in uniformed personnel to UN peace operations (July 2025)

Francophone T/CCs contributing to UN Peacekeeping operations	Amount of uniformed staff deployed
Rwanda	5905
Morocco	1697
Senegal	1293
Cameroon	1132
Tunisia	932
Mauritania	793
Burundi	774
France	660
Côte d'Ivoire	250
Djibouti	238
Republic of Congo	187
Burkina Faso	95
Niger	77
Togo	58
Mali	38
Canada	32
Chad	29
Benin	26
Guinea	25
Switzerland	21
Vanuatu	6
Madagascar	3
Algeria	2
Belgium	1
Total of troops	14274

⁷ "[Statistiques de la participation francophone aux opérations de paix](#)", REFFOP, July 2025.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ "[Uniformed Personnel Contributing Countries by Ranking Experts on Mission, Formed Police Units, Individual Police, Staff Officer, and Troops As of: 31/07/2025](#)", UN, Department of Peace Operations, 8 September 2025.

¹⁰ These calculations were made by the author on the basis of the REFFOP figures of July 2025.

"[Statistiques de la participation francophone aux opérations de paix](#)", REFFOP, July 2025.

¹¹ "[Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018-2028](#)", UN, Department of Peace Operations, 2017.

personnel, still far from the 15% UN target to be reached by 2028¹².

African-contributing countries represent most of the francophone T/PCCs identified and also account for the largest number of deployed francophone troops. Examining the francophone contribution to peace operations therefore requires particular attention to these countries. They are, in fact, expected to contribute not only to UN missions but also to AU missions and particularly to Peace Support Operations (PSOs), a regional responsibility reinforced by the new Resolution 2719 (2023)¹³. This dual engagement presents a specific challenge and reflects a primary concern of the African states involved, which face difficulties in navigating this duality of norms, implementation capacities, and still-evolving practices.

However, the statistical figures mentioned above provide only a partial understanding of francophone actors in peacekeeping. On the one hand, though the countries identified by REFFOP as francophone meet certain criteria for classification, caution is needed regarding language proficiency at the individual level for each military and police personnel from these countries. Unfortunately, the UN does not currently track the linguistic skills of uniformed personnel, so only estimates are possible. French is more often than not a second or even third language for many individuals, even when it is an official language in their home country. Nationality alone cannot reliably indicate the linguistic capabilities of uniformed personnel. For example, Belgian contingents deployed to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) between 2006 and 2012 were predominantly from the Dutch-speaking region of the country and interacted primarily in English with the population¹⁴.

On the other hand, francophonie in peacekeeping extends far beyond the 24 countries identified by REFFOP. Many UN peacekeepers and civilian personnel speak French out of personal interest or professional opportunity, without specific national incentives. Moreover, the concept of francophonie can include the many countries involved in the OIF. In 2025, the OIF comprised 53 member states, 5 associate members, and 32 observers—for a total of 90 states either directly or indirectly involved. Several T/PCCs that are members of the OIF but not included on the REFFOP list actively support the French language learning among their troops. For example, Ghana, Egypt, Romania, and Cambodia, have reinforced French language training for their soldiers ahead of deployment in Mali and now in Central African Republic¹⁵. Other countries, such as Italy, while neither on the REFFOP list nor OIF members, have nevertheless developed an interest in French for their peacekeeping contributions¹⁶. Finally, some officially francophone countries do not currently contribute to the UN peacekeeping system and may face specific obstacles in initiating such a process.

¹² These calculations were made by the author on the basis of the REFFOP figures of July 2025.

"[Statistiques de la participation francophone aux opérations de paix](#)", REFFOP, July 2025.

¹³ "[Resolution 2719 \(2023\)](#)", UNSC, S/RES/2719 (2023), 21 December 2023.

¹⁴ LIÉGEOIS Michel, "[Making Sense of a francophone Perspective on Peace Operations: The Case of Belgium as a Minor francophone State](#)", *International Peacekeeping*, 19:3, p. 316-332, August 2012.

¹⁵ "[Formation au français pour les femmes Casques bleus cambodgiennes](#)", OBG, October 2025, accessed October 28, 2025.

¹⁶ In the context of the Berlin Ministerial Meeting, Italy committed to provide training in French in partnership with Senegal.

"[List of Member State Pledges](#)", UN, UN Ministerial Peacekeeping, UN Peacekeeping, 29 May 2025.

In addition, being listed by REFFOP or belonging to the OIF does not necessarily indicate a political willingness to cooperate with other francophone countries. On the contrary, these two lists are heterogeneous and include actors who do not always work together in practice. Colonial history, border disputes, historical, economic, and/or political rivalries are all sources of tension that can influence a state's decision to engage - or not - in joint action with other francophones.

From this perspective, "*Acting together as francophones*" is, above all, a political choice made by state actors who identify as such, within a group with relatively vague boundaries. This can ensure two foundational aspects of joint political and operational action: 1) a shared understanding of objectives 2) the goodwill of the actors involved. That said, the "francophones" can function as a variable-geometry space for action, depending on the issues and context, and remain vulnerable to policy shifts at the individual level.

Though it is not possible to establish a definitive list, this summary note will be based on a relative understanding of the "*francophonie*" in peacekeeping. It is not strictly addressed to the 24 countries identified by REFFOP as francophone T/PCCs, but more broadly to all UN Member States identifying as francophones, whether they currently participate or wish to participate in the peacekeeping system in the future. It is also addressed to personnel deployed by these T/PCCs, UN personnel in missions and at headquarters, the OIF, and academic researchers.

Following the approach of the 2020 synthesis note, this study aims to strengthen joint action among francophone actors willing to engage. Its purpose is to identify bridges, cooperation opportunities, and tools to reinforce networking, and, ultimately, to sustain their capacity to contribute fully to the UN peacekeeping system.

Part 2 – Political Axis – Amplifying the Voices of Francophone Contributors

This second part presents proposals and avenues for recommendations concerning diplomatic and institutional work relating to peacekeeping. This section presents a non-exhaustive list of reflections on the obstacles to francophone actors' full participation in peacekeeping decision-making—primarily at the UN and, to a lesser extent, at the African Union (AU) and within Regional Economic Communities (RECs)—as well as on potential responses to these challenges. Francophone actors remain free to consider these ideas as they see fit.

Box 1 - *La francophonie, a political cooperation forum among others*

From a political and diplomatic perspective, the francophonie does not constitute a uniform entity. As an international organization, the Francophonie has been marked in recent years by deep and lasting political divisions. For example, Burkina Faso and Mali, which are both part of the REFFOP list of 24 francophone T/PCCs, left the OIF and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2025, amid tensions with their francophone neighbours in West Africa as well as with France.

The national and international context therefore continues to have a strong impact on the decision of states to participate - or not - in collective francophone action on peacekeeping.

Moreover, the francophonie is far from being the only space for cooperation open to UN member states and can sometimes find itself in competition with other groups. As Dr. Arthur Boutellis¹⁷ from the *International Peace Institute* (IPI) noted, states often engage simultaneously in multiple cooperation arenas, whether subregional, regional, linguistic, etc. In New York, for example, the diplomatic representatives of African countries often work to project a voice in discussions on UN peace and security matters, whether they are French-speaking or not.

The francophonie as a space for cooperation must identify where it can be most useful and relevant, but also where it can bring actors together around a common foundation. In the context of political and institutional peacekeeping issues, several challenges common to many T/PCCs emerge from the work already conducted by the Observatory¹⁸, its events, and the interviews carried out for this study. Among other things, French-speaking T/PCCs face difficulties in:

- 1) navigating the administrative procedures – often in English – related to POs,
- 2) keeping track of the evolution of UN needs, norms and standards for operational deployment,
- 3) making their voices heard in a political space where most of the work is conducted in English, particularly in informal discussions and negotiations.

1. Increase the visibility and networking of francophone actors across the multiple political and institutional arenas of peacekeeping (UN, AU, RECs)

- a. Identify francophone points of contact within relevant UN departments to reduce barriers to information access*
- b. Encourage dialogue and cooperation between diplomatic representations, UN, AU and RECs staff, and the “third UN”*

The 24 francophone T/PCCs identified by REFFOP represent 20% of all T/PCCs. Based on this narrower list, it can be estimated that at least 20% of diplomatic representations and associated state bodies involved in peacekeeping are likely to prefer French as a working language. Though French is one of the UN's six official languages and one of the two working languages of its Secretariat, in practice it remains relatively little used, as most of the multilateral work is conducted in English. This creates an obstacle for staff of the diplomatic Permanent Missions (PMs) of the various francophone T/PCCs present in New York, as well as for personnel in their central national administrations, for whom English may not necessarily be a professional prerequisite.

¹⁷ Dr. Arthur Boutellis quoted in "[Les enjeux de la francophonie dans le maintien de la paix - état des lieux et perspectives sur l'engagement des pays contributeurs de troupes et de police francophones dans les OP](#)", Panel 1 - Enjeux politiques et institutionnels francophones du maintien de la paix, *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)*, November 2024.

¹⁸ SANTOPINTO, Federico, "[Pistes et propositions pour renforcer la contribution francophone aux opérations de paix](#)", *loc cit.*

For example, the omnipresence of the English language in informal UN “corridor negotiations” can hinder the ability of francophone Permanent Missions to make their voices heard and to engage in technical discussions during these informal exchanges¹⁹

Within UN institutions, it is particularly useful for francophone Permanent Missions to identify francophone points of entry within the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), the Department of Operational Support (DOS), and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), which facilitate a better understanding of administrative procedures and, by extension, their effective appropriation by T/PCCs. Francophone services remain limited in several key services and bodies: the ITS, LCM, TPP, but also the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET), and the Office of Military Affairs (OMA)²⁰. Maintaining a stable number of francophones in these bodies is likely to become even more challenging in light of the budget and personnel reductions the UN is considering for 2026. Direct contacts continue to serve as an important informal channel for facilitating T/PCCs’ understanding and implementation of administrative procedures related to peace operations. In this respect, we can also highlight how useful the “Guide pratique des pays contributeurs” (“*Practical Guide for Contributors*”) is. This 2019 book – currently being updated and upgraded by France and UNITAR – is intended for French-speaking T/PCCs and reviews the practical steps to be taken to deploy troops for the UN²¹.

Networking among francophone actors can also help strengthen their presence in New York. Establishing a collective voice on some specific peace and security issue can provide greater political leverage within UN decision-making bodies. This cooperation can be achieved through the creation of more informal forums for exchange, allowing states to agree on common positions where and when deemed relevant. This is some of the work currently undertaken by the Group of Francophone Ambassadors (GAF) in New York (see Box 2).

Box 2 - FOCUS: the Group of Francophone Ambassadors (GAF)

The OIF Representation to the United Nations has been providing technical support for several years to the “Group of francophone Ambassadors” (GAF) in New York. This informal platform brings together more than thirty diplomatic representations of francophone countries and aims to facilitate debate, consultation, and political coordination among these actors. These joint efforts can include the adoption of a common diplomatic language on a political issue, support for francophone candidates for certain positions—particularly within the Security Council—and information sharing. The group addresses peacekeeping through its platform of military, police, and peace operations advisors and experts, focusing on better consideration of linguistic and intercultural issues in UN peacekeeping activities.²²

¹⁹ Ambassador Ghislain Ondias Okouma quoted in “[Les enjeux de la francophonie dans le maintien de la paix - état des lieux et perspectives sur l’engagement des pays contributeurs de troupes et de police francophones dans les OP](#)”, Panel 1 - Enjeux politiques et institutionnels francophones du maintien de la paix, *Boutros-Ghali Observatory*, November 2024.

²⁰ Interview with a member of a diplomatic representation.

²¹ “[Etre acteur des opérations de paix des Nations Unies - Guide pratique des pays contributeurs](#)”, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2019.

²² Interview with a member of a diplomatic representation and “[Le Groupe des ambassadeurs francophones de New York discute de ses priorités pour 2025](#)”, *OIF*, January 2025.

It should be noted that the OIF has undertaken similar initiatives with several international institutions, including in Addis Ababa, where the GAF is working on the issue of the implementation of resolution 2719 (2023)²³.

Furthermore, the Permanent Missions of francophone T/PCCs in New York have very uneven capacities to follow all UN debates. When some European Permanent Missions can rely on more than 40 staff members, many African Missions have fewer than 10. It is necessary for them to select and prioritize among the numerous meetings and discussions that must be monitored at the UN. Moreover, the diplomatic and administrative staff present are not necessarily specialists in peace and security issues, let alone military and police affairs, which makes it difficult to follow up and participate in decisions relating to peacekeeping²⁴. Pooling this monitoring work is one possible approach to ensuring the full participation of francophone T/PCCs. In practice, several informal initiatives already move in this direction, with some Permanent Missions relaying information from meetings on topics such as human rights or development issues. Other non-institutional actors can also be more involved in supporting their political and technical preparation. This “third UN”²⁵ composed of experts who have served in the missions, former senior UN officials, academic researchers, think tanks and civil society, can provide valuable technical support.

Such networking work can also be relevant in Geneva (headquarters of several UN agencies), Addis Ababa (AU Headquarters), or even subregional capitals such as Abuja (headquarters of the Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS).

2. Strengthen the role of French-speaking T/PCCs in shaping norms and political decisions related to peacekeeping

- a. Consider joint francophone action in certain UN decision-making bodies (UNSC, GA, C34, 5th Committee, working groups, etc.)*
- b. Promote collaborative bilateral and multilateral approaches to support technical capacity-building*

Representing at least 1 out of 5 T/PCCs, the francophonie as a group can legitimately provide a voice in debates and decisions related to peacekeeping. Moreover, at the United Nations, several decision-making bodies and spaces could be further invested within the framework of joint action.

As the central body responsible for establishing and renewing the mandates of peacekeeping missions, the UN Security Council (UNSC) currently includes one permanent francophone member (France) and regularly sees a francophone country occupying one of the ten non-permanent seats: Gabon in 2023,

²³ "[Addis-Abeba : rencontre des ambassadeurs francophones avec le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général de l'ONU auprès de l'UA](#) », OIF, October 2025.

²⁴ Interview with a member of a diplomatic representation.

²⁵ Dr. Arthur Boutellis quoted in "[Les enjeux de la francophonie dans le maintien de la paix - état des lieux et perspectives sur l'engagement des pays contributeurs de troupes et de police francophones dans les OPs](#) ", *loc. cit.*

Switzerland in 2024, and the DRC in 2026²⁶. In addition to the ability to vote on resolutions mandating Missions, such roles also allow states to act as *penholders*, i.e. drafters of resolutions. This responsibility, which is very technical, also opens the field to a significant capacity for influence and symbolic power. However, francophone Permanent Missions do not always have the expertise or human resources required to assume such a demanding role. Here again, the pooling of capacities represents a relevant avenue to support the assumption of these responsibilities, provided that appropriate forms of cooperation are identified. For example, Resolution 2719 on UN support to AU PSOs was co-drafted by 3 African non-permanent SC members: Gabon, Ghana and Mozambique (known as "A3")²⁷.

Another key forum for peacekeeping is the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (known as "C34") which meets annually to formulate recommendations to the UN Secretariat and member states. A French-speaking group, led by Morocco, regularly brings a common voice within this body. Other UN organs that exercise varying degrees of influence over peacekeeping could be engaged in a similar manner, should francophone actors consider it relevant. These include, inter alia, the UN General Assembly; the Fifth Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matters—which determines the budget of United Nations peace operations and is a significant authority in the context current context of financial crisis; and various ad hoc working groups. In this regard, particular attention may be drawn to the upcoming meetings, starting in January 2026, of the Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE). This subsidiary body of the Fifth Committee convenes every three years to update the COE Manual, which notably defines the compliance framework for the equipment or standards. Thus it can decisively affect a country's ability to contribute to the United Nations peacekeeping system.

3. Identify and strengthen common foundations for multilateral and regional political action

- a. Identify and prioritize political convergence points*
- b. Update common political priorities in light of the crisis of multilateralism*

In order to achieve coordinated, effective and convergent action, it is key that the francophone T/PCCs agree on the common orientations to be taken forward in the various identified forums. Such a francophone "collective voice" can enhance the weight of the priorities identified—provided this is done in a judicious manner. This note explores here below three possible common foundations: (1) strengthening multilingualism; (2) promoting the primacy of prevention and political solutions to conflict; and (3) preparing for the reform of peacekeeping initiated by the United Nations.

The promotion of the French language, as a core pillar of OIF's work, is echoed by the UN, which regularly renews its commitment to multilingualism²⁸. However, the UN's capacity to bring this multilingualism to life in an official manner remains limited. In the context of peace operations, multilingualism can contribute to effective mutual understanding among personnel, as well as to enhanced interaction with the local populations and the host state. Interestingly, French is an official

²⁶ " [Permanent and non-permanent members](#) ", *UN Security Council*, accessed November 5, 2025.

²⁷ " [Le Conseil de sécurité adopte une résolution sur le financement des opérations de soutien à la paix menées par l'Union africaine](#) ", *UN*, Coverage of Meetings & Press Releases, December 21, 2023.

²⁸ " [Cooperation between the United Nations and the International Organization of La Francophonie](#) ", *United Nations General Assembly*, A/79/L.121, August 2025, preamble.

language of two host countries of a UN peace mission – MONUSCO in the DRC and MINUSCA in CAR. It is therefore important to continue the OIF's advocacy for multilingualism and French-language learning, to enhance peace operations' effectiveness across various political frameworks.

Secondly, the francophone T/PCCs may consider how to better promote a joint position on the challenges of prevention, mediation and the primacy of political solutions to conflict²⁹. These orientations constitute general guidelines regularly reaffirmed by the UN Secretariat, and are central to Measure 16 of the Pact for the Future³⁰. In this regard, General Birame Diop, Minister of the Armed Forces of Senegal, calls on francophone actors to focus their efforts on prevention, notably through the improvement of good governance, support for democratization processes, and political engagement in favour of sustainable peace. Such an approach may resonate particularly strongly among African francophone T/PCCs, as the African Union also places prevention at the core of its priorities - notably through its good offices, mediation efforts, and the work of the Council of Elders.

Thirdly, it would be wise to identify common priorities in the context of the major reform of peacekeeping announced under the *Pact for the Future* at the end of 2024³². For 2026, the United Nations Secretariat is preparing a crucial report on the future of all forms of peace operations, addressing a wide range of political, operational and capability-related issues. Mandate frameworks, mission performance, the regionalization of peace and security, countering disinformation, mine action, the protection of civilians, and the Women, Peace and Security agenda are among the many areas likely to be examined in this broad examination. Francophone T/PCCs have an opportunity to make their voices heard in the context of this process. Meanwhile, it could possibly provide some answers to their administrative, institutional and operational challenges. Such institutional reflection can also be a chance to reposition multilingualism at the heart of the discussion on the work of peace operations³³. However, these prospects for reform are overshadowed by the significant budgetary and liquidity crisis currently faced by the UN, which undermines its ability to finance multidimensional POs and support African PSOs under resolution 2719 (2023)³⁴. There is no doubt that many T/PCCs, both francophone and non-francophone, share legitimate concerns about these aspects. Defining a common basis for action may give more weight to these many concerns, particularly regarding the budgetary management of peace operations.

²⁹ For more information: Ollivier Bertrand, "[Les Opérations de paix et la primauté des solutions politiques aux conflits. Portée et défis du rôle de la médiation](#) ", *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)*, November 2023.

³⁰ " [Pact for the Future](#) ", *loc. cit.*

³¹ General Birame Diop quoted in "[Les enjeux de la francophonie dans le maintien de la paix - état des lieux et perspectives sur l'engagement des pays contributeurs de troupes et de police francophones dans les OP](#) ", Main intervention – "Role, contribution and future of the Francophonie in peacekeeping ", *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)*, November 2024.

³² " [Pact for the Future](#) ", *loc. cit.*

³³ Interview with a member of a diplomatic representation.

³⁴ " [Resolution 2719 \(2023\)](#) ", *loc. cit.*

Part 3 – Operational Axis – Strengthening the Training Architecture and Francophone Cooperation

This last section sets out proposals and possible recommendations regarding the operational preparation's responsibilities that fall upon T/PCCs. The elements presented below constitute a non-exhaustive and fragmented set of reflections. This section focuses on training-related challenges, which have been the subject of several activities conducted by the Observatory in recent years. As previously noted, these avenues are intended as reflections that T/PCCs, the United Nations and other relevant francophone stakeholders remain free to consider.

Box 3 – Towards more modular peace operations –implications for T/PCCs?

The participation of the T/PCCs in the UN peacekeeping system should not be understood from a purely quantitative perspective. It is not a question of providing the largest possible number of troops to the UN. On the contrary, the long-term trend is towards a smaller number of peacekeepers - there were nearly 105,000 in 2015 compared to 61,000 in 2025³⁵. This number is set to be further reduced in 2026, since the UN recently announced a reduction of nearly 14,000 positions in the POs military and police components, as a result of the current financial and budgetary crisis³⁶.

The UN is now placing greater emphasis on specialized skills, such as the Neutralization, Clearance, Destruction of Explosive Devices (NCDED); countering disinformation, misinformation, malinformation and hate speech (MDMH); quick reaction forces (QRF); the operation of surveillance drones; and medical capabilities.

This trend is confirmed by the independent study "*The future of peacekeeping, new models and related capabilities*"³⁷ commissioned by DPO in 2024. The study calls for greater modularity in peace operations, arguing in favour of missions with smaller contingents, more focused and realistic mandates, and a targeted catalogue of priority tasks. To this end, the United Nations will primarily require troops identified for their specific technical expertise. It is essential for T/PCCs to grasp the scale and accelerating pace of such change, and to identify areas of specialization in line with United Nations' needs. T/PCCs will need to remain attentive to the evolving mission requirements and to rapidly adapt their preparation and training programmes. This increased demand for agility is a challenge for all troops and police-contributing countries, regardless of their profile.

³⁵ "[Troops and Police Contributors](#)", "Department of Peace Operations", accessed October 2025.

³⁶ "[ONU: près de 14 000 casques bleus bientôt rapatriés face à une coupe budgétaire historique](#)", *Radio France International (RFI)*, 14 October 2025.

³⁷ Wane El-Ghassim, Williams Paul D., Kihara-hunt Ai, "[The Future of Peacekeeping](#)", *loc. cit.*

4. Improve and diversify training offers to better respond and adapt to the needs of peace operations

- a. Strengthen the monitoring of emerging United Nations needs for training, troops and equipment*
- b. Identify and develop training programmes aligned with these needs*
- c. Open some training courses to the non-commissioned officer level to facilitate understanding and coordination within the chain of command*

Current United Nations orientations tend towards an ever-greater specialization of uniformed personnel in missions (see Box 1 above), to adjust mission responses to real-time developments - which are lately synonymous with a complexification of the security context in host countries. For the United Nations, such adaptability in the field requires that T/PCCs act at the level of pre-deployment preparation of peacekeepers³⁸. To this end, the United Nations *Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System* (PCRS) now publishes quarterly summaries of the current and emerging requirements of peace operations, whether in terms of training, type of troops or equipment³⁹. The Boutros-Ghali Observatory includes in its newsletter a translation (in French) of the section dedicated to emerging training needs, in order to facilitate access to and dissemination of this information among a francophone audience⁴⁰.

For francophone T/PCCs wishing to pursue and strengthen their contribution to the peacekeeping operations system, it may be useful to take stock of the current skills of their troops, identify strengths and areas of specialization, both current and potential, as well as gaps. This assessment of skills is fundamental to understand which technical or thematic areas require additional efforts within existing national training programmes. This will help identify new training areas to be developed. Supporting the identification of new training themes can allow a T/PCC to gain both technical expertise and to position itself at the forefront of an emerging issue, which may contribute to its visibility. For example, the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA) recently developed a new programme on the Climate–Peace–Development Nexus. In 2024, it also launched a pilot training course on this topic, delivered in French, which brought together trainees from nearly a dozen other francophone training centres⁴¹.

The diversification and strengthening of training programmes may also involve broadening their audience. Particularly, they could include intermediate military levels such as non-commissioned and

³⁸ GRIP ASBL, " « [Intervention Principale par la RSSG Bintou Keita, cheffe de la MONUSCO](#) », Séminaire de l'Observatoire à Entebbe en Ouganda – La formation du personnel en uniforme des opérations de paix : adapter le modèle actuel aux défis et enjeux contemporains, *YouTube*, 22 July 2024.

³⁹ This bulletin is distributed every three months in English, and is freely accessible on the PCRS website. For more information: <https://pcrs.un.org/SitePages/Home.aspx>

⁴⁰ For more information, see the " [News](#) " section of the REFFOP website.

⁴¹ " [Formation sur le climat, la paix et la sécurité dans le cadre des opérations de paix](#) ", OIF, 27 March 2024. EL-KOUNY, Nour, " [Le Nexus Climat, Paix et Développement : Un lien sous-exploré dans le contexte des opérations de paix](#) ", *OBG Newsletter*, December 2024.

junior officers - a recommendation made by several speakers at the Observatory's seminar in Entebbe in 2024. For General Régis Colcombet, Director of Security and Defence Cooperation (DCSD) at the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (MEAE), this inclusion could notably allow for better performance within the " *backbone of command* " ⁴². In a context of reduced deployed personnel paired with the UN's pursuit for advanced technical expertise, this inclusion could represent a valuable asset to enhance operational effectiveness and support sound mission conduct.

Box 4 - The new UN Digital Training Resources: the Peacekeeping Resource Hub and Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (2025)

The UN provides a growing selection of manuals and training materials for T/PCCs through a new, open-access online platform: the *Peacekeeping Resource Hub*. This online platform centralizes all documents related to the preparation of uniformed personnel in missions, in three parts: 1) policies and guidelines governing preparedness, 2) training materials developed by the UN and (3) the DPO evaluation framework.



At the heart of this system, the UN has recently updated its *Core Pre-deployment Training Materials* (CPTMs). These materials constitute the mandatory training foundation for all mission personnel. The French-language version of the modules has just been made available - since November 2025 - on the Peacekeeping Resource Hub website.

However, it must be noted that the inventory of training manuals available on this United Nations platform remains far more extensive in English. As a note, these materials would benefit from being translated into the Organization's other official languages, including French ⁴⁴.

⁴² General Régis Colcombet quoted in "[La formation du personnel en uniforme des opérations de paix : adapter le modèle actuel aux défis et enjeux contemporains](#) ", Panel 1 - Adapter l'offre de formations aux besoins émergents : défis et perspectives, *Boutros-Ghali Observatory*, May 2024.

⁴³ "[Basic Pre-Deployment Training Equipment \(CPTM\)](#) ", *Pre-Deployment Basic Training Equipment, Peacekeeping resource Hub*, accessed November 2025.

⁴⁴ The Boutros-Ghali Observatory lists all the UN training documents available in French on its website, in the "[Training and Careers Resources](#) " section.

5. Strengthen and diversify training tools and formats to enhance learning

- a. *Identify and take ownership of the digital tools available to enhance training contents*
- b. *Promote the emergence of new pedagogical tools, learning methods and training formats that facilitate learners' engagement*

Beyond substantive issues, innovation in training also touches upon the format of the courses themselves. As a result, both new tools and new training practices now characterize the field of pre-deployment training.

On the one hand, digital tools play an increasingly important role in training, facilitating both online and hybrid courses—i.e. partly remote and partly in person. One example is the “Gender Military Advisers” online training course (in French) launched by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)⁴⁵. It is also possible to develop interactive exercises accessible online, such as those created for the *Méthode « En Avant ! »*, a new course designed for learning French in military context⁴⁶. Targeted mobile applications are also being developed, an approach increasingly used by the UN itself, including for training purposes. Examples include the UN Mobile Buddy First-Aid training application (available in French and English), which prepares personnel to provide essential first aid within the first 10 minutes of an incident⁴⁷ or the UN Deployment Review mobile app (see Box 5 below).

Box 5 - Focus on RETEX

To quickly and effectively detect changes in the state of needs within peacekeeping missions, but also to better address gaps in the preparation and implementation of mandates, it is essential for POs to provide effective experience feedback (RETEX). The UN is now encouraging deployed personnel and T/PCCs to contribute to this mechanism through the UN Deployment Review Mobile App⁴⁸. Developed by the *Light Coordination Mechanism* (LCM), it facilitates the sharing of experiences and lessons learned, enabling training, preparedness and support for deployed forces to evolve more rapidly in the future.



⁴⁵ " [L'OIF et L'UNITAR s'associent pour créer une formation en ligne sur le genre dans les OP destinée aux CMG et PFMG](#)", *OBG Newsletter*, L'actualité des formations francophones, January 2022.

⁴⁶ See Box 6 below for more information.

⁴⁷ LORET Herbert and ALOË Sophie, "[Les applications mobiles du LCM – un exemple d'innovation au service de la sûreté et de la sécurité des Casques bleus](#)", *OBG Newsletter*, Editorial, September 2023.

⁴⁸ " [Deployment Review mobile application](#)", *Department of Peace Operations, UN*, accessed 30 October 2025 and LORET Herbert, ALOË Sophie, "[Les applications mobiles du LCM](#)", *loc. cit.*

These digital resources offer several advantages: accessibility, wider audience reach, self-paced learning, and interactivity. The latter constitutes a fundamental aspect, recognized as a significant pedagogical asset by many, including Eleanor Pavey, a trainer at UNITAR⁴⁹. For francophone T/PCCs, these existing materials can help consolidate learning and strengthen training pathways at minimal or even no cost. In this regard, it is worth highlighting the work of the Peace Operation Training Institute (POTI), an online training platform focused specifically on peacekeeping, which currently offers 24 courses in French. Through external contributions, POTI has made its courses freely accessible to 99% of its learners and seeks to strengthen partnerships with more training facilities. Other actors provide similar online platforms, such as UNITAR or the United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC).

On the other hand, new training practices are emerging with regard to training formats, beyond online and hybrid courses. One main innovation in that regard are mobile training teams (MTTs). MTTs are small groups of trainers with specific, often emerging expertise, capable of being deployed across multiple training sites throughout the year. This format allows the transfer of knowledge and skills not yet available at a local centre, facilitating rapid dissemination to a broader audience. Such flexibility enables quick responses to emerging needs identified by the UN, thereby increasing the overall responsiveness of the peacekeeping system.⁵¹

6. Support linguistic education and behavioural skills

- a. Promote language learning and multilingualism among T/PCCs*
- b. Consider skills trade with other T/PCCs seeking to improve their French proficiency*
- c. Beyond technical skills, value soft skills such as intercultural understanding*

Overall, multilingualism is a “core value” of the UN, meanwhile language skills are recognized under the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) framework as one of the “*specialized skills needed to carry out peacekeeping operations*”⁵². However not a guarantee of success, proficiency in local languages can represent a key asset and useful soft skills for certain deployed soldiers and police officers, especially if

⁴⁹ Eleanor Pavey quoted in “[La formation du personnel en uniforme des opérations de paix : adapter le modèle actuel aux défis et enjeux contemporains](#)”, Panel 3 - Assurer la résilience des acteurs de la formation : pérenniser les enseignements et les compétences, *Boutros-Ghali Observatory*, May 2024.

⁵⁰ For more information: POTI, “[Présentation : l'Institut de formation aux opérations de paix : promouvoir la paix par la formation à distance par l'équipe du Peace Operations Training Institute \(POTI\) – Mars 2025](#)”, *OBG Newsletter*, Editorial, March 2025.

⁵¹ For more information: PEMBOURA Aïcha, “[Enjeux et défis de la formation au sein des OMP : le cas des équipes mobiles de formation \(MTT\) en Afrique](#)”, *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)*, December 2024.

⁵² “[Cooperation between the United Nations and the International Organization of La Francophonie](#)”, *United Nations General Assembly*, A/79/L.121, August 2025, p. 6.

their role involves regular contact with the population and/or local authorities. At the same time, the lack of multilingualism may be an obstacle to missions' performance. As noted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) Bintou Keita, this can happen when two contingents share no common language yet must work together ⁵³. Depending on their deployment objectives, francophone T/PCCs could therefore encourage the learning of other languages within their contingents, including English- the working language of several peacekeeping missions (notably UNMISS in South Sudan)- as well as local languages such as Lingala (DRC), Sango (CAR), or Nuer (South Sudan).

Francophone T/PCCs and other training stakeholders also play a key role in providing specific language skills. French is the UN's second working language alongside English and is also present as an official language and/or *lingua franca* in several peacekeeping host countries (MONUSCO and MINUSCA, in the DRC and CAR, respectively). As a result, certain non-francophone T/PCCs have identified French as a language skill to strengthen, and are seeking partners to support such development. For instance, in 2024 and 2025, the OIF expanded its French language courses aimed at future contingents of the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti (MSS)⁵⁴.

Box 6 – “En Avant!”, LexicoPaix, and Lexikozé: three new digital tools for learning French

In recent years, three tools have been developed by the OIF and its partners to promote free and easy access to learning French and Haitian Creole. These tools, which are actively intended for personnel deployed in peace missions, demonstrate the flexibility that digital resources can offer in support of pedagogy⁵⁵.

- The Méthode “En Avant!” – aimed at learning French terminology for the military - is a multimodal tool. It consists of a set of booklets for teachers and learners, structured in three volumes, as well as audio tracks available on *YouTube*, and interactive online exercises. The method focuses on task-based learning relevant to military life, facilitating day-to-day conversation in a compound.
- Lexicopaix is a free mobile application – also available offline – for learning French vocabulary words with regards to international security and defence cooperation. It offers more than 600 vocabulary terms related to the work of mission personnel, and the possibility of completing this lexicon by adding personalised entries.
- Lexikozé, developed alongside Lexicopaix, follows a similar approach to learn more than 400 words of Haitian Creole useful for the troops deployed in the country. Visual and audible aids accompany this self-paced learning.

⁵³ GRIP ASBL, "[Intervention Principale par la RSSG Bintou Keita, cheffe de la MONUSCO](#)", *loc. cit.*

⁵⁴ "[Haïti : Formation linguistique et interculturelle des contingents surinamais](#)", OIF, February 2025, "[Haïti : Formation linguistique et interculturelle des contingents de la MMAS](#)", OIF, January 2025, "[Formation linguistique et interculturelle du deuxième contingent kényan en phase de pré-déploiement pour Haïti](#)", OIF, November 2024 and "[Formation linguistique et interculturelle du personnel de défense et de police d'Antigua-et-Barbuda déployé en Haïti](#)", OIF, September 2024.

⁵⁵ These three learning tools are available in open access on the *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)* website. Please see "[Outils pour l'apprentissage des langues et des compétences interculturelles en mission de paix](#)", *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)*, updated November 2025.

Moreover, as the needs of the United Nations seem to be increasingly focused on technical skills, it continues to value specific soft skills. Beyond the challenging issues of troop conduct and discipline, the UN also encourages better preparation and awareness of intercultural issues. According to the SRSG Bintou Keita⁵⁶, intercultural communication is an asset both in interacting with local communities and national authorities, as well as within the missions themselves among contingents from different national military or police cultures. Several actors have already offered training in this area, such as the *United States Institute of Peace* (USIP) and UNITAR⁵⁷.

7. Consolidate and diversify bilateral, multilateral and multilingual training partnerships

- a. *Support the mapping of all pre-deployment training courses and active actors in the field*
- b. *Strengthen dialogue and networking across the sector: between T/PCCs, UN training services and other actors in peacekeeping training*

Although innovation and capacity building in training require significant investments, these efforts can be pooled through partnerships between actors wishing to develop their training offer. These actors may provide complementary expertise or resources (hosting capacity, funding, pedagogical tools, digital tools, etc.) to one another.

A first step in this process is to identify all existing pre-deployment training programmes, to better understand where complementary expertise lies and where extra-training could be an added value. This work has been initiated by the UN Integrated Training Service (ITS), through the new online platform of the Light Coordination Mechanism - known as LCM Online System (LCMOS). The platform allows for the mapping of existing training programmes and centralizing of key information ; thus facilitating the identification of potential alignment and common interests among training actors⁵⁸.

Training facilities and educational institutions for peacekeeping from French-speaking T/PCCs may also benefit from gaining a deeper understanding of the UN's capabilities, which have actively developed various mechanisms in recent years. In addition to ITS, the LCM, and UNITAR cited previously, it is worth mentioning the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP). The TPP has, for the past ten years, aimed to strengthen mission capabilities in four essential areas: engineering, medical support, C4ISR technologies, and telemedicine.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ GRIP ASBL, " [Intervention Principale par la RSSG Bintou Keita, cheffe de la MONUSCO](#)", *loc. cit.*

⁵⁷ LUNTUMBUE Michel and DIEU Charlotte, " [L'interculturalité dans les opérations de paix onusiennes : état des lieux et pistes pour une prise en compte efficiente](#) ", *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)*, March 2022 and " [Compétences Interculturelles Dans Les Missions De Paix](#) " *UNITAR*, accessed October 30, 2025.

⁵⁸ " [Analyse des besoins actuels et émergents en termes de formation dans les OP- Septembre 2025](#) ", *OBG Newsletter*, October 2025.

⁵⁹ " [UN Triangular Partnership Programme \(TPP\)](#) " (In French), *UN, Department of Operational Support (DOS)*, November 2025.

Having a good overview of the activities of all potential partner organizations can pave the way for connections with new interlocutors, beyond immediate or even continental neighbours, and could particularly foster multilateral and South-South partnerships. If such transnational activities are deemed relevant by actors of the sector, their financing remains a challenging issue. In this regard, it is worth noting a related OIF initiative, which in 2023 launched a call for projects to support twinning among training centres within the REFFOP network. For example, instructors from the Romanian Gendarmerie Officer School “Mihai Viteazul” (Romania) and the CCCPA (Egypt) were able to benefit from a joint training on the methodology of teaching French conducted by the Centre for Applied Linguistics (CLA) of the University of Franche-Comté in Besançon (France)⁶². It could be beneficial to see more organizations focus their efforts on funding similar multilateral activities.

8. Accelerate networking among francophone schools and peacekeeping training centres

- a. Consolidate the networking among training centres through dialogue platforms and opportunities for exchange and collaboration*
- b. Foster institutional memory and level-maintenance of the centres*
- c. Identify relays to inform partners following major international meetings*

If training centres in Latin America or the Asia-Pacific region have already consolidated knowledge-sharing networks, such cooperation has not yet developed to a comparable scale on the African continent, particularly among francophone African T/PCCs. These networks can serve as forums for discussion, dissemination of information and sharing of best practices, all of which are essential for enhancing training capabilities. The largest network of this type remains the anglophone *International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres* (IAPTC), which organizes an annual meeting for its members. Its African chapter, the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA)⁶⁴ hosted by Cameroon remains under-resourced compared to its counterparts and would benefit from reinforcement. In parallel, the OIF also supported the creation of the Francophone Network for Expertise and Training in Peace Operations (REFFOP) in 2014, which brings together all francophone training actors across continents in a more transversal approach. These two complementary platforms could be further encouraged to cooperate with one another⁶⁵.

⁶⁰ SANTOPINTO Federico, "[Pistes et propositions pour renforcer la contribution francophone aux opérations de paix](#)", *loc cit*.

⁶¹ Interview with a peacekeeping trainer.

⁶² "[Le CCCPA et l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie \(OIF\) organisent la Première Formation de Renforcement des Capacités Linguistiques en Français pour les Casques Bleus Égyptiens](#)", CCCPA, January 2024.

⁶³ Interview with a peacekeeping trainer.

⁶⁴ For more information: <https://apstafrica.org/fr/>

⁶⁵ Interview with a peacekeeping expert.

Greater involvement in these various initiatives requires internal human resources capacity within training centres, which is not always permanently available. Several challenges can be identified: 1) a lack of personnel, particularly administrative staff familiar with the technical procedures of the various UN bodies and international partners; 2) regular staff mobility, particularly at the leadership level⁶⁶.

These difficulties can hinder the engagement of training centres in networking processes, thereby exacerbating inequalities in access to new opportunities. One potential solution would be to enhance “mid-level” communication among staff from different facilities, alongside the existing exchanges at senior levels. Ensuring the presence of multiple representatives from each centre at in-person meetings would also multiply points of contact, supporting stronger institutional memory of exchanges.

However, some training centres from francophone T/PCCs participate very little - to none at all - in these international networks, despite their role as capacity accelerators. Whether due to financial constraints or limited English proficiency— as English is often the working language of these international networks—some centres remain relatively marginalized. Here again, partnerships, even relatively informal ones, could help mitigate this issue. At the diplomatic level, and particularly in New York among Permanent Missions to the UN, some countries commit to reporting (or even translating) technical meetings for peers unable to attend⁶⁸. Some training facilities, better staffed and/or with extended language capacity, could play a similar role.

9. Integrate into a multi-level training architecture (UN, AU, RECs)

- a. Increase awareness of the African Peace and Security Architecture, and its training component, among francophone T/PCCs*
- b. Encourage the harmonization of the respective UN and AU training architectures, the sharing of good practices and multilateral cooperation*
- c. Support the creation and translation of UN and AU training frameworks*

The UN is reinforcing its regional partnerships in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. On the African continent, this means consolidating the Regional Peace and Security Architecture through the African Union (AU), and the subregional architecture through the Economic Communities (RECs).

⁶⁶ For example, REFFOP organized two-year intervals, in 2022 and 2024, brainstorming workshops in the presence of more than a dozen representatives of training centres. Only one representative of a school was present at these two exchanges.

⁶⁷ Interview with a peacekeeping expert.

⁶⁸ Interview with a diplomatic representative.

In its military and police dimensions, this regionalization of peacekeeping is reflected in several possible deployment formats that can simultaneously involve francophone T/PCCs from the continent:

- The African Standby Force (ASF)
- African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations (PSOs) – recently strengthened by UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)⁶⁹
- Subregional forces – such as the short-lived Southern African Development Community (SADC) Force in the DRC.

These formats also translate into specific objectives in terms of pre-deployment preparation, in parallel with those of UN peace operations. Yet, francophone T/PCCs are not always familiar with the work carried out by the AU in the field of training. There is therefore a clear need to increase awareness and circulation of information on this aspect. Such step seems fundamental in the context of the regionalization of peacekeeping. One could envision a platform modelled on the UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub (see Box 4) and/or the UN LCM Online System (LCMOS), enabling the centralization of useful information at the African level. A platform such as APSTA could play a supportive role in such an initiative.

Strengthening the UN/AU partnership on peace and security also requires closer cooperation between the two institutions. Three fundamental aspects of this rapprochement are the harmonization of training standards, the updating of the various materials and the interconnection of their training services. On this front, francophone T/PCCs, both in and outside Africa, have a key-role to play. Indeed, both the UN and the AU seek to strengthen and expand their operational preparation activities but struggle to secure the necessary support, creating gaps, particularly regarding resources available in French. As primary users of manuals in this language, francophone T/PCCs have a clear interest in engaging in these efforts. Notably, through the PCRS, the UN is actively encouraging the T/PCCs to nominate *Subject Matter Experts* (SMEs) capable of developing new training content on emerging topics⁷¹. Francophone T/PCCs willing to do so are encouraged to participate both in the creation of these materials – thus placing themselves at the source of standards – and in their translation.

The AU is also seeking to expand its training offer. Francophone training institutions could be particularly valuable, as the AU currently does not appear to offer training in French for military and police personnel, nor does it have French translations of its training materials. They could therefore provide support, whether in the creation of new training frameworks or the translation of existing ones⁷².

⁶⁹ " [Resolution 2719 \(2023\)](#) ", *loc. cit.*

⁷⁰ Interview with a peacekeeping expert.

⁷¹ See in particular: " [Analyse des besoins actuels et émergents en termes de formation dans les OP- Septembre 2025](#) ", *loc. cit.*

⁷² Interview with a peacekeeping expert.

10. Support capacity-building among francophone and multilingual trainers

- a. *Promote training-of-trainers (ToT) programmes aimed at francophone instructors*
- b. *Facilitate the exchange of best practices and lessons learned to strengthen the knowledge and skills base of the sector*

The growing demands and requirements in training require corresponding human resource capacities. In other words, the multiple actors involved in peacekeeping training discussed here must be able to rely on a pool of trainers capable of meeting the evolving training needs of peacekeeping missions. Several participants at our 2024 seminar on training challenges noted that Africa lacks francophone trainers⁷³. This situation remains of great concern also due to the regionalization of peacekeeping, notably through Resolution 2719 (2023). Addressing this challenge requires both increasing the number of trainers and enhancing their technical expertise.

One approach already pursued by several training actors is to offer training-of-trainers (ToT) courses specifically aimed at francophone instructors. France, in partnership with the OIF, has offered such programmes for several years, in the hope to foster the pedagogical skills of officers (military, gendarmerie, and police). In 2025, 32 participants from 27 countries benefited from this programme⁷⁴. Such training remains a significant investment for the hosting organization, a capacity that remains limited to a few actors. The development of hybrid or online courses can help overcome these limitations, meanwhile bilateral or multilateral partnerships could pool capacities.

Deepening the knowledge base of trainers also involves facilitating the exchange of best practices and lessons learned among instructors from different training centres and organizations, at a more horizontal level. Organizing opportunities for meetings and discussions between trainers – including via online platforms where appropriate – could encourage more informal interactions conducive to trust-building. Associations such as the IAPTC and APSTA can play a role in facilitating this type of dialogue and in helping to pool the costs of such initiatives.

⁷³ "[La formation du personnel en uniforme des opérations de paix : adapter le modèle actuel aux défis et enjeux contemporains](#)", Panel 3 - Assurer la résilience des acteurs de la formation : pérenniser les enseignements et les compétences, *Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG)*, May 2024.

This information was also corroborated during an interview with a peacekeeping trainer.

⁷⁴ "[8e édition de la formation francophone de formateurs au maintien de la paix](#)", *OIF*, May 2025.

Box 7 – Call for improving the pedagogical performance

It is essential for the UN that personnel deployed by T/PCCs can adequately internalize the standards of preparation, tools, techniques, and conduct objectives. However, this general theoretical goal often encounters practical challenges for instructors. Eleanor Pavey, a trainer at UNITAR, summarizes the situation as such: “the message is not getting through”⁷⁵. Discussions with several peacekeeping trainers—whether through Observatory events, visits to training centres, or interviews conducted for this briefing note—highlight the need for more cross-cutting reflection on teaching pedagogy. Several suggestions emerged from these exchanges:

- Develop more interactive courses, considered more conducive to adult-learners' engagement - e.g. "serious games", "war games", and other simulation games, quizzes, discussion times, digital media, testimonies, etc.
- Foster a diverse class to prepare troops for the diverse environment of peace missions. For example, some training centres now offer courses gathering military and civilian learners to increase collaboration capabilities.
- Adapt the teaching tools to ensure every learner can fully engage, even those with limited basic skills- e.g. one training centre in the REFFOP network has developed visual aids for its contingent soldiers with limited literacy in French.

⁷⁵ Eleanor Pavey quoted in "[La formation du personnel en uniforme des opérations de paix : adapter le modèle actuel aux défis et enjeux contemporains](#)", *loc. cit.*

⁷⁶ Interview with a peacekeeping trainer.

About the author

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The Boutros-Ghali Observatory on Peacekeeping is a forum for discussion between experts and French-speaking personalities from troop-and-police-contributing countries. It contributes to strengthening triangular dialogue between Member States engaged in peacekeeping, the UN Security Council, and the UN Secretariat.

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